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Lights, Cameras, Quorum Call: A Legislative History of Senate Television

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LIGHTS, CAMERAS, QUORUM CALL:
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SENATE TELEVISION

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Government

The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

by


Christopher Maloney

1990

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
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


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Approved, August 1990



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	iv
LIST OF FIGURES.....	v
ABSTRACT.....	vi
CHAPTER I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONGRESSIONAL- MEDIA RELATIONSHIP.....	2
CHAPTER II. THE HISTORY OF SENATE TELEVISION: 1979-1986.....	19
CHAPTER III. WHY DID S.RES. 28 PASS THE SENATE	44
CHAPTER IV. AN OUTGROWTH OF SENATE TELEVISION: 'THE INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM IN THIS TOWN'	71
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	77
VITA.....	84

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1	April 20, 1982 vote to invoke cloture on Senate Resolution 20, providing for television and radio coverage of Senate floor proceedings.....46
2	February 27, 1986 vote on Senate Resolution 28, providing for experimental television and radio coverage of Senate floor proceedings.....47
3	Ages of senators when entering the Senate—those who voted on Senate Resolution 28 and were not present for the 1982 cloture vote.....50
4	Ages of senators when leaving the Senate—those present for the 1982 cloture vote but departed by 1986 vote on Resolution 28.....56
5	Breakdown of 1982 cloture vote—separating those who entered the Senate in 1980 and those who entered pre-1980.....62
6	Breakdown of 1986 vote on Senate TV—separating those who entered the Senate in 1980 or later and those who entered prior to 1980.....63
7	Breakdown of 1982 cloture vote—separating senators based on their party affiliation.....64
8	Breakdown of 1986 vote on Senate TV—separating senators on the basis of party affiliation.....65
9	Breakdown of 1982 cloture vote—separating senators based on party affiliation and start of Senate service.....66-67
10	Breakdown of 1986 vote on Senate TV—separating senators based on party affiliation and start of Senate service.....68-69

ABSTRACT

This study explores the legislative history of Senate television, examining the proposition that changes in the Senate's membership in the 1980s contributed to the body allowing itself to be televised for the first time in 1986.

The paper examines the historical relationship between the media and members of Congress and traces the history of media coverage of the Congress, looking at the outcome of legislation introduced in both the House and Senate dealing with the introduction of radio mikes or television cameras into their respective chambers. A chapter of the study is devoted to the history of the passage of Senate Resolution 28 in 1986, which allowed gavel-to-gavel television coverage of the Senate for the first time.

The study suggests that generational changes in the Senate in the 1980s contributed significantly to the passage of Senate Resolution 28. By comparing a 1982 vote on Senate television and the 1986 vote which approved the project, it was found that younger, newer breed politicians, with more experience and ease with television, were more amenable to allowing television coverage of the Senate than were the older generation of senators who they replaced.

**LIGHTS, CAMERAS, QUORUM CALL:
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SENATE TELEVISION**

CHAPTER I

AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONGRESSIONAL–MEDIA RELATIONSHIP

To better understand the U.S. Senate’s decision to televise its proceedings in the summer of 1986, it may be wise to first look at the traditional relationship between Congress and the media as well as examine the history leading up to the Senate’s decision.

The relationship between members of Congress and the media, as it is with other popularly elected officials, including the president, has been characterized in most academic literature as a symbiotic or reciprocal one. As Michael Baruch Grossman and Martha Joynt Kumar point out in “Portraying the President: The White House and the News Media:”

Continuing forces shape both [the media and the president] more than specific incidents, however traumatic, or the impact of particular personalities, however unusual. What’s more, the cooperative elements in this relationship are at least as strong as those that are antagonistic, for a fundamental reason: presidents and news people depend on each other in their efforts to do the job for which they are responsible. (Grossman and Kumar, p. 14)

Political scientist Timothy E. Cook compares the ongoing struggle between press and politician to the couple fighting to see who will lead the dance. He writes that the conflict between the two is predictable, but that it is “bounded and regulated, whether by a shared presumption of ground rules or by formal mechanisms of conflict management. In the process, no one ends up being consistently dominant.” (Cook, p. 30) As former *Washington Post* White House correspondent Lou Cannon remarked, “The payoff on the symbiotic relationship is news for the correspondent and tenure for the politician.”

(Cannon, p. 183)

In a democratic society where the media is privately held and not government controlled, members of Congress rely on the media, in much the same way as the president does, to disseminate information about the working of government and policy choices that are being made on behalf of the people. On a more parochial or self-interested level, members rely on the media to give themselves and their issue positions publicity. Most U.S. Senators, along with most Representatives, have designated one or more of their staff to maintain contact with journalists. The work of these employees ranges from writing and issuing press releases on their boss's work, answering inquiries from reporters, setting up press interviews for the Senator or other members of the staff, or issuing statements on breaking news. Writing in 1962, Representative Clem Miller nicely summed up the need Congressmen have for the press and for press coverage. "If the press did not report Congress, Congress could hardly function. If the sound of congressional voices carried no farther than the bare walls of the chambers, Congress could disband." (Miller in "Guide to Congress," p. 737) Or, looking at the relationship from the Congressman's viewpoint, Douglas Cater points out that "the member of Congress is uniquely creator and creature of publicity. It is the nature of his job to be concerned with that amorphous substance known as public opinion." (Cater in Cannon, p. 186)

The importance of the media and its reporting on members takes on added importance when it's taken into account that few Americans understand the complex machinations of their Congress. Congress' piecemeal approach to making policy, combined with arcane internal rules and constraints, often times leaves the public at a loss to explain their work or their votes. As former Speaker of the House James Wright, Democrat of Texas, remarked: "We are a hydra-headed monster compared to the president." (Hess in Davidson and Olsezek, p.

141) Former New York Times correspondent Hedrick Smith observed more recently that, “In this simplified world, Congress is too brawling and diverse to follow easily, because it deals openly with the complexity of issues, whereas the White House deals with most complexities in private. The result is that comparatively speaking, Congress is undercovered and the president overcovered. (Smith, p. 399) Mr. Smith went on to say that the Congress plays a relatively minor role in what he calls “the running soap opera of politics, [because] television needs a leading man, and the president fits the bill....The presidency becomes a TV serial; the president, his family, his aides and cohorts become recognizable characters in the play.” (Smith, p. 400)

Representative Robert Michel, the House Republican leader from Illinois, took this line of thinking one step further at a recent National Press Club speech:

In the 1980s, the Great Communicator Ronald Reagan dominated the medium [of television] as if Congress existed in some kind of communication time warp bypassed by the electronic age in terms of quantity and quality of coverage....Presidents have all those things that television loves—ceremony, helicopters, pageantry, sound bites, falling balloons and most important, one human being for the camera to concentrate on. Covering Congress is reporting on a very complicated institutional process. It’s an acquired taste, like Scotch or string quartets or maybe even Sam Donaldson....Television reporting on Congress takes second place to reporting on the president.” (Michel on C-SPAN, Dec. 7, 1989)

While it is a given that members of Congress need the press, it is also a given that reporters just as badly need members of Congress. As Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek write:

Reporters and their sources are locked in a love-hate embrace. Each has what the other craves: sources have information on which reporters’ jobs depend; reporters have the power to create publicity, the lifeblood of political

careers. Whatever their private feelings, reporters sense that they cannot disclose certain things if they want future interviews. Lawmakers know that cultivating the press corps pays off in good publicity. (Davidson & Oleszek, p. 153)

It is clear, then, that the media is more than an omniscient and uninterested observer in the public policy process. Rather, the media is an interested and human player in the political game and is of vital importance as a transmitter of information from elected officials to their constituents. The ironic note in the media's rise to high stature is that its rise was not foreseen by the men who founded the 13 American colonies. The constitutional convention, which convened in Philadelphia in 1787, met behind closed doors. Indeed, the document they drafted contained no specific mention of granting guaranteed freedoms of the press. ("Guide to Congress," p. 738)

Indeed, in their first years of debate and work, neither the House nor the Senate allowed journalists into their galleries to listen and report on the debates. The House opened its galleries in 1790; the Senate followed four years later in 1794. ("Guide to Congress," p. 738) In arguments to be repeated in the debates on television coverage in the 1980s, the Senate came under fire from many for its delay in opening its proceedings to the press and public. Opponents of opening the Senate's sessions believed "that opening the doors would promote oratorical pyrotechnics for the benefit of the gallery and press and would interfere with the expeditious performance of public business." (Byrd, p. 27) The National Gazette opined in 1792 that:

This patrician style, this concealment, this affection of pre-eminence but illy accords with the spirit of republican government. The Constitution of the United States acknowledges no superiority of one legislative body over another, and to assume it is a violation of its principle, and an insult to the character of freemen. It is a strange maxim in republican policy, that the agents of the people

should keep their deliberations concealed from those from whom they derive their political existence. (Swanstrom in Byrd, p. 9)

When the Senate did open its gallery to the media and the public on December 7, 1795, the move was heralded by a man who has been dubbed the first congressional news correspondent. Samuel Harrison Smith, writing in 1802, said the Senate's decision was "prelude to a more genuine sympathy between the Senate and the people of the United States" and that supporters of an open Senate were each to be regarded as a "friend of the true principles of our republican institutions." (Gorton, Congressional Record, July 29, 1986, p. S 9765)

Some lament the importance of the media. This group contends that policymakers now know less about the substance of legislation and the reality of governing and more about how to get their name on the evening news or in the newspaper. As Representative Richard Bolling, Democrat of Missouri, commented in his book "House Out of Order:"

"City-reared members, whose only view of a cow has been of a can of condensed milk, can get their names quoted in the press as experts in agriculture. A House member whose travel consists of a triangular course between West Wetdrip, Washington and the Army-Navy game in Philadelphia can make the news with outrageous comment about our foreign aid program simply by getting a press handout to the gallery early in the morning. A member who can't keep his family accounts in balance can be quoted on the president's economic message to the Congress provided he looks at an advance copy and sends a statement to the gallery first thing in the morning." (Bolling in "Guide to Congress," p. 742)

While it is clear that members can effect how they are perceived by the type of press operation they have and the attention they give to their media image, it is also clear that the media exerts an equal force in determining what the image, or what a specific policy, may turn out to be. "Through sensitive media relations, members can readily influence news coverage of Congress. But

the nation's media in the process can change the way that senators and representatives act, and indeed how the House and Senate function. At times, moreover, the press can exert an enormous impact on what issues members address and what Congress does about them." ("Guide to Congress," p. 744, col. 1) Historians have pointed out many times in our nation's history, from the entrance of the United States into the Spanish-American War to our changing policies in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, where the press has exerted a substantial influence on the outcome of a significant government policy.

Another facet of this relationship, as borne out in Representative Bolling's remark made in 1965, is the increasing use members of Congress are making of the media. In an study compiled in 1981, Michael Robinson found some interesting differences between the congressional classes of 1958 and 1978. The class of 1978, he wrote, was three times as likely to depend on television to campaign as their predecessors were. The study showed younger members were more inclined to use the House recording studio to prepare shows or interviews to be sent back home than was the class of 1958. Also, sixty percent of the class of 1978 used media consultants in their election campaigns. More recently, Timothy E. Cook found that the number of House members who designated one of their staff as a press secretary shot up from 54 in 1970 to 243 in 1986. Mr. Cook sees the increase of press secretaries on Capitol Hill as the result of a heightened media consciousness among members as well as being "a reaction at all levels to resources made generally available and to the presence of the news media in the contemporary political world." (Cook, p. 72-73)

Former Speaker Wright's comment that Congress is a "hydra-headed monster" has found believers in other fields as well. Writing in the *Federal Communications Bar Journal*, Clark Puntigam argues that, aside from the actual government powers either of the three branches of government possess,

the ability to communicate effectively to the public is by itself a vital component of a given branch's power. He writes:

The dynamic power of each branch is more or less determined by its ability to communicate directly with the electorate, so as to justify and gain the confidence of their respective actions. According to this view, communication itself is power, and exclusive access to the communication media is an unchecked, unbalanced power. If one branch of the government is able to gain nearly exclusive or at least effective access to any or all of the media, while the other branches are more or less excluded, the balance of power will lean in the direction of the branch with access. (Puntigam in Garay, p. 16)

Speaking on the same subject, but as one of the parties directly effected by what was perceived to be a predominance of the airwaves by the executive branch, Senator J.W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas and the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the height of the Vietnam War, wrote:

Under our Constitution there is no paramount branch of the federal government; if indeed the framers regarded any branch as *primus inter pares*, it was not the executive but the Congress, whose powers are spelled out in the Constitution at the greatest length and in greatest detail. If the president is regarded as having the right to communicate with the people through the mass media whenever he wishes, the spirit and intent of the Constitution requires that no less privilege be accorded to the Senate and the House of Representatives—or if it should claim it—to the judiciary. (Senate Communications Subcommittee in Garay, p. 67)

Prior to taking a look at the legislative history of Congressional television and radio, it is interesting to note Ronald Garay's theory on the rise of television access in Congress in the 1970s and 1980s. Garay believes, as does Puntigam, that Congress' efforts to improve its own accessibility to both its floor and committee proceedings seemed to coincide with the Congressional desire to "reestablish its policymaking initiative." (Garay, p. 20) While there were certainly other factors at work in Congress' decisions to increase its access to

the media, such as its desire to modernize and update archaic rules and procedures, the underlying notion here is that access to the public meant visibility and visibility in turn would mean enhancement of the branch's role, mission, and power.

While it may appear that Congress first began experimenting and changing its policies toward media access in the 1970s, that assumption would be deceiving and erroneous. Actually, as early as February 1922, when Representative Vincent Brennan, Republican of Michigan, introduced H.J. Res. 270 which called for allowing complete radio coverage of both the House and Senate floor proceedings, members of Congress have taken an interest in getting their message out to the American people and opening up its doors to public scrutiny. Representative Brennan was one of the early proponents of radio coverage and his bill met the fate of a number of other similar bills in the 1920s—they were referred to committees, never to make it out and back on the floor for serious consideration.

The first minor ripple in the history of media access to Congress occurred in December 1932. Speaker of the House John Nance Garner, Democrat of Texas, at the time was steadfast in opposition to radio coverage of House debates. There was particularly keen interest at the time in House debates in December 1932 as members were debating the repeal of the 18th amendment of the Constitution, which had banned the consumption of alcohol. Despite Speaker Garner's opposition, some enterprising reporters from CBS and NBC Radio circumvented the Speaker's wishes. The reporters placed microphones in a doorway area just off the House floor. The microphones picked up the debate and the vote counts clearly and transmitted them to listeners. While there was substantial audience interest in the debate, the event did not create the stir backers of Congressional radio may have hoped for. Congressional leadership

still did not give serious consideration to opening the way to radio coverage.

Ronald Garay notes that during the first half of the 20th century, most members of Congress had little interest in adopting full scale radio coverage. The reason was simple and politically beneficial for any incumbent member of Congress: at this time most radio stations were exceedingly generous in granting members of Congress uninterrupted and unedited time on the air. Broadcasters provided the time for free and members of Congress made ample use of the privilege, speaking unfiltered to their constituents. Even allowing complete radio coverage on the floor could not equal the opportunity the radio industry was regularly making available to members of Congress. (Garay, p. 29)

In 1944, a consistent voice in Congress for broadcast coverage drafted a bill to provide radio coverage of the Senate. Senator Claude Pepper, Democrat of Florida, introduced a bill that would have allowed radio coverage of the full Senate as well as its committees. His bill, like a similar one he would introduce in 1947 to allow television coverage, the first bill of its kind in either body, was not reported out of committee.

Radio coverage was given more serious attention from March to June 1945. The occasion was the hearings of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, whose work would culminate in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Chaired by Senator Robert LaFollette, Progressive of Wisconsin, and Representative Mike Monroney, Democrat of Oklahoma, the group devoted a portion of its time to discussing the issue but it was not included in the final measure passed into law.

By the late 1940s, the talk among supporters of direct radio coverage was eclipsed by those wanting television coverage. In fact, television cameras were allowed in the House of Representatives for the first time to record the opening of the 80th Congress on January 3, 1947. Broadcasting magazine described the

major event of the day's coverage in a news brief in the back of an issue: "Aside from telephoto lens dropping from television camera to floor of House Friday, first telecast of Congress went off as scheduled. No interruption, two cameras used. Lens damaged. Nobody hurt." (*Broadcasting*, January 6, 1947, p. 86) The cameras would not get back inside the House chamber for thirty years.

During this time, congressional committees were slowly beginning to allow television cameras into the hearing rooms of Capitol Hill. On March 30 and April 2, 1948, the Senate Armed Services Committee allowed cameras into its proceedings as it considered the country's need for universal military training. In August 1948, the House Un-American Activities Committee opened its hearings, on communist infiltration of the government, to the media. The hearings lasted 21 days and included historic exchanges and charges between Alger Hiss and Whittaker Chambers. From 1948 to 1951, five other committees allowed broadcast of their deliberations.

One of the watershed marks of Congressional television came from January to March, 1951. The Special Senate Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, known more commonly as the Kefauver Hearings after their chairman Senator Estes Kefauver, Democrat of Tennessee, held hearings in 14 American cities, of which seven were covered in whole or in part by television crews. The hearings helped foster Senator Kefauver's 1952 campaign for president, according to some sources. (Doig, p. 484) This despite the fact that the committee's chairman may have been "as gawky a Tennessean as ever ambled down the Senate aisles." (Doig, p. 483) Although the hearings won an Emmy award (for "bringing the working...of government into the homes of the American people"), the hearings simultaneously raised serious issues associated with television as a medium covering a deliberative, public policy event. (Garay, p. 38) Many of the arguments presented in the aftermath

of the Kefauver hearings would be recurring ones, appearing when both the House and Senate considered opening their doors to television.

During the Kefauver Hearings, witnesses were cited for contempt for failing to answer questions put to them by committee members. The witnesses claimed that testifying before an open committee meeting, being watched by potentially millions of viewers, infringed on their constitutional right to have a fair and impartial hearing. The Senate voted to uphold the convictions of contempt on the uncooperative witnesses after considerable debate. A federal court later overturned the convictions in October 1952 ruling that the witnesses were fully within their rights in not testifying and were wholly justified in not responding to questions from the committee members. As journalist Douglas Cater wrote later, even the committee's chairman had mixed feelings about some of the panel's action:

In retrospect, Kefauver too has expressed misgivings about certain aspects of the hearings. He has said that he was mistaken in ordering a gambler to testify before the television cameras. Late in 1954, Kefauver sent a letter to Lyndon Johnson of Texas, soon to become Senate Majority Leader of the Eighty-Fourth Congress, in which he showed a keen realization that investigative procedures had gone astray. 'I have been aghast...at the excesses to which the various committees of Congress have gone in the fields of the so-called subversive investigations,' he wrote. 'They have made us all look ridiculous by their headline grabbing tactics.' (Cater, "Estes Kefauver...", in Doig, p. 490)

There was considerable debate within Congress after the Kefauver Hearings about continued television coverage of congressional committee hearings. Opponents of television coverage argued that the mere presence of television cameras led to posturing by Senators and created an atmosphere that was not conducive to a calm and deliberative examination of fact and opinion. These opponents felt there was little sense in exposing witnesses to the public,

that coverage encouraged unbecoming behavior by members, that the due process of witnesses was unconstitutionally infringed upon, and further that there is no constitutionally recognized right for the public to know or see everything that goes on in its government. Backers of continued coverage countered that the public does have a right to know about the workings of its government, that the public should have the right to view a government event by television if they would be allowed access to walk unimpeded into a Congressional hearing room, and further that the public should be encouraged to use news coverage from the mass media to measure the effectiveness and the performance of their legislators.

Three years after the Kefauver Hearings, Senator Joseph McCarthy, Democrat of Wisconsin, held hearings which began April 22, 1954, examining communist infiltration in the American military. All three commercial networks covered at least portions of the hearings, with ABC covering them gavel to gavel. After these hearings, which frequently featured Senator McCarthy badgering witnesses, many thought unfairly, there were renewed calls in Congress to promulgate a standard of fair practice for conducting committee hearings.

On the House side during the 1940s to the 1960s, there is little to give background on for two fundamental reasons: Speakers Sam Rayburn, Democrat of Texas, and John McCormack, Democrat of Massachusetts. Both speakers unilaterally decided there would be no television cameras in a House committee hearing room or on the House floor so long as they had power to stop it. This policy would not change until the passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, of which section 116 allowed television and radio coverage of House committee hearings if the hearing was open to the public and is in keeping with the specific rules each individual committee adopts.

The next significant event in television's relationship to Congress, and many argue the most important, was the televising of the proceedings of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. More commonly known as the Watergate Committee, the broadcast networks devised their own rotation for covering the committee's deliberations and devoted 319 hours of coverage to the ongoing investigation of the Nixon administration and its campaign activities. Following the deliberations of Watergate committee, the networks aired in total the impeachment proceedings undertaken by the House Judiciary Committee. The coverage was watched by some 70 million people according to unofficial estimates—a figure that was almost double the population of the United States in 1868 when President Andrew Johnson became the first president to be impeached. (*Broadcasting*, August 5, 1974, p. 16) In its final report, the committee let its reasoning on why they let the cameras in to the hearing room be known:

The Committees' interest in televising hearings was not to obtain publicity for publicity's sake. The facts which the committee produced dealt with the very integrity of the electoral process; they were the facts, the committee believed, the public had a right to know. Most citizens are not able personally to attend the working sessions of the Government. Although thousands of people spent short periods in the Caucus room during the hearings, these visitors represented only a small percentage of the electorate. Thus, it was desirable that every citizen be able to view the hearings, if not in the caucus rooms, then in his home or place of business. The ability to read about the hearings could only be achieved by observing the witnesses and hearing the testimony." (Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities in Garay, p. 74)

In 1974, the Senate's examination of televising their floor proceedings grew a bit more intense. Under the chairmanship of Senator Lee Metcalf, Democrat of Montana, the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations began

to scrutinize some possibilities for coverage. Senator Metcalf's hearings, and his introduction of S.Res. 447 to allow cameras in the Senate chamber, laid the groundwork for what was to come, although that resolution, and a subsequent one he introduced in 1975, were given little consideration. (Garay, p. 83) Meanwhile, on December 19, 1974, cameras were permitted in the Senate on a one-time basis only—to cover the swearing-in of President Gerald Ford's new vice president, Nelson Rockefeller.

On the House side in the 1970s, with the passing of the domineering leadership styles of John McCormack and Sam Rayburn, many members were actively pursuing plans for House television. In January 1975, Representative John Anderson, Republican of Illinois, introduced H.Res. 110, a bill to conduct a test of audio and visual coverage of House proceedings. His proposal, like those of Representatives Jack Brooks and B.F. Sisk, which called for closed circuit coverage and network coverage of floor activity, met a similar fate—they did not reach the House floor for consideration.

While there was considerable internal discussion both on the House Rules Committee and the Ad Hoc Committee on Broadcasting, chaired by Representative Sisk, new Speaker Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill unilaterally and unexpectedly announced that beginning March 15, 1977, there would be a 90-day live test of House television coverage. The pictures of the House, would be available only in the Rayburn room, directly off the House floor, and in the Rayburn office building, one of the three major House offices on Capitol Hill. Speaker O'Neill said his office would control the experiment "to assure that any disturbance to the nature and character of the House proceedings would be minimized." (Garay, p. 97)

The experiment began on schedule March 15 with one observer in the Rayburn building noting that watching "certainly beat monitoring the lobby of

a retirement hotel after midnight...but not by much.” (Garay, p. 98) In the last days of the experiment, the Select Committee on Congressional Operations, which was helping the Speaker carry out the test, sent out 150 questionnaires to members soliciting their views. Few members saw any adverse effects to making coverage permanent and readily accessible to the public. The Select Committee later authored a report, at the completion of the television experiment, stating that “neither technical nor policy considerations stand in the way of a permanent [House broadcasting] system.” (Garay, p. 100)

On October 6, 1977, Representative Gillis Long, Democrat of Louisiana, took recommendations from the committee and crafted a bill, H.Res. 821, to allow complete television coverage of House floor proceedings. The House Rules Committee acted quickly and held two days of hearings on the Long bill, adding a provision requiring the House Rules Committee to conduct a study of the questions involving control of the television system. With that provision, the bill now known as H.Res. 866, moved to the floor October 27. The House passed the bill with little debate by a vote of 342-44 thereby granting the speaker the power to continue to expand the closed circuit television system.

In February 1978, the House Rules Committee conducted the hearings on the control of the television system that would relay pictures of House floor activity. While there were several options under consideration, only two proposals received serious attention and debate. Led by Representatives Anderson and Sisk were those seeking a network pool arrangement for House television coverage. Their desire to have an outside, independent source in their view was indispensable. As Representative Sisk wrote in the New York Times: “If the broadcasts appear censored or in any way restricted, the validity of the coverage will be questioned. Rather than enhancing the House credibility, broadcasts that are considered self-serving could tarnish its image.” (Garay, p.

104)

The other proposal under serious consideration was to have a House television system controlled by the Speaker of the House or by a special House committee. The House Rules Committee adopted this approach in June 1978, by a vote of 9-6. After addressing itself to the drawbacks of the two approaches, the majority report concluded:

We see no violation of first amendment rights if the House operates the broadcast coverage. On the contrary, the House will not impose on all broadcast journalists the unchangeable judgment of only one of their colleagues [as would be the case with a single television director]. Fears of censorship are completely warranted. The House has committed itself to providing complete and unedited access to its proceedings, unedited by the House or by any other hand.... It is because of this deeply imbedded news and drama oriented predilection of the broadcast media—perfectly understandable and commendable for their legitimate purpose but inappropriate for what we see as the fundamental purpose of the coverage—that we reject network pool control and recommend House operation of the system. (Garay, p. 106-7)

The judgment of the House Rules Committee was endorsed by the full House June 14. The vote was 235 to 150. After nine months of preparation, the House went on the airwaves and was available gavel-to-gavel to roughly 3.5 million cable households through the Cable Satellite Public Affairs Network, more commonly known as C-SPAN. Then-Representative Albert Gore Jr., Democrat of Tennessee, made the first statement from the floor. “Television will change this institution, just as it has changed the executive branch, but the good will outweigh the bad. From this day forward every member of this body must ask himself or herself how many Americans are listening to the debates which are made.” (Garay, p. 115-16)

Despite Representative Gore’s words, the first day of House television was greeted in some quarters by humorous cynicism. PBS correspondent Paul

Duke said, “They started off with a good typical day. It was uninspiring and dull.” (Perry, p. 16). The chief counsel of one House committee told the same reporter, “Look at them, all dressed up in their three-piece suits. It looks like a giant ad for Brook Brothers. If it goes anywhere, it’s the end of civilization as we have known it.” (Perry, p. 16)

Whether it was the end of civilization or not, many senators on the south side of Capitol Hill would be watching House television with a close eye.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORY OF SENATE TELEVISION: 1979-1986

As chapter one showed, the House did not rush to its decision to allow television coverage of its floor proceedings. Proponents of Senate television were keeping a watchful eye on House TV's early months. In fact, shortly after March 19, 1979, the day of the House television debut, Senator Robert Byrd, the Senate majority leader and Democrat of West Virginia, said he would be watching progress in the House to measure how the Senate should best proceed with its own television coverage, if it were to proceed at all. (Garay, p. 118)

Although the first day of House television has been called historic, there was another event which took place two years earlier in the Senate that was arguably of equal import. Before the Senate began floor deliberations on the newly proposed Panama Canal Treaty, a controversial arrangement which called on the United States to eventually relinquish control of the canal, Senator Byrd introduced S.Res. 268 to allow radio and television coverage of Senate floor proceedings, limited to the debate about the treaty. Senator Byrd said that in exercising its advice and consent role as mandated by the Constitution, the Senate needed an informed citizenry to ensure that the collective wisdom be used to make a decision on the treaty. (Garay, p. 95)

Senator Byrd's bill was assigned to the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. After studying the bill, and working with lighting and technical consultants to consider the many problems associated with lighting the Senate chamber, the committee removed all references in the proposal to television coverage, leaving intact its plan to allow for live radio coverage of floor debate. The bill was reported to the full Senate February 2, 1978, and quickly passed,

less than a week before the treaty debate was scheduled to begin.

The Senate began debate on the treaty February 8 with CBS and NBC radio carrying brief excerpts of the debate, while National Public Radio carried the floor proceedings in their entirety, with only slight interruptions for its reporter, congressional correspondent Linda Wertheimer, to identify speakers and provide background information on the proceedings. National Public Radio's gavel-to-gavel coverage won widespread acclaim and fared better in the ratings than the network's normal daytime programming. In what would turn out to be prophetic commentary, to be seen in later evaluations of congressional television, on National Public Radio's coverage, the *Washington Post* opined that, "Far from encouraging showboating the microphones seemed to concentrate senatorial minds and create conditions conducive to a spirited exchange of opposing views." (Garay, p. 96) Years later, speaking at a forum examining the first ten years of congressional television, Senator Byrd remarked that having television coverage of the treaty debate would have helped his side make its case. "I wish we had television in the Senate when I brought up the Panama Canal Treaty," he said. "I think the people of this country would have understood the issues better and would have understood better than they did in the face of all the propaganda that went out against those treaties..." (Byrd, "Ten Years of Televising Congress")

Despite the generally acknowledged success of National Public Radio's coverage of the Panama Canal debate, pushing a bill through the Senate allowing for complete television coverage of floor proceedings remained, at best, an open proposition. Except for one brief effort by then-Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker, Republican of Tennessee, to allow one-time only basis coverage of the SALT II treaty debate, little formal consideration of Senate television's possibilities took place until 1981.

On January 6, 1981, Senator Baker, who had just become the Senate's majority leader, introduced S.Res. 20 that would have allowed for continuous live coverage of Senate floor proceedings. Senator Baker made no secret of the fact that he considered bringing television coverage to the Senate one of his top legislative priorities. While many senators publicly acknowledged an openness to the idea of television [an informal poll conducted by C-SPAN at the time showed 19 senators against or leaning against; 57 senators in favor or leaning in favor of the bill; while 23 senators were undecided], there were powerful and savvy foes lined up against allowing any form of Senate television coverage. (Garay, p. 119) Chief among them was Senator Russell Long, Democrat of Louisiana and longtime chairman of the powerful Senate Finance Committee. (Garay, p. 119)

Senator Baker's bill was referred to the Senate Rules Committee, which held three days of hearings on the proposal in April 1981. When Senator Baker testified before the panel, chaired by Senator Charles Mathias, Republican of Maryland, he stressed the importance of TV coverage in breaking the cocoon atmosphere that pervades Washington, that coverage would allow citizens to see their elected representatives at work, and would begin to redress the imbalance of power between the Senate and the more exposed and visible executive branch. (Garay, p. 120) As for other technical concerns, Senator Baker said, "There are no insurmountable lighting, temperature, camera location, or editorial control problems [with Senate television]... The most difficult issue is more of a philosophical nature; that is, can the Senate effectively serve its deliberative role with the people watching our every move?" (Garay, p. 119) The primary voice of opposition to Senator Baker's bill was, not surprisingly, Senator Long. Senator Long said the mere presence of cameras would effectively stifle meaningful dialogue between senators on the floor. Instead, he said, senators

would tailor their remarks to constituents watching on television at home, rather than to the issue at hand on the Senate floor. “The greatest surplus commodity we have in the Congress are speeches that need never be made,” Senator Long said. “Speeches that fail to improve on silence.” (Garay, p. 120)

On July 8, 1981, the Rules Committee reported S.Res. 20 to the Senate floor, only to have the bill sit for six months while Senator Baker waited for the opportune moment to bring the bill up for debate on the Senate floor. When he brought the bill to the floor in February 1982, Senator Baker jokingly realized that there may never be an opportune moment to easily pass a bill allowing television coverage—he pointed to an inordinately large number of cough drops in Senator Long’s Senate desk, hinting that the opposition may filibuster to prevent the bill’s passage. “I must confess...that I observed surreptitiously the deposit of three rolls of cough drops in the desk drawer of the distinguished Senator from Louisiana, which may be a bad sign, at least for me.” (Baker, Congressional Record, February 2, 1982, p. S 269) The Senate considered the television bill from February 2-4, 1982, as the arguments which had hitherto been made only in Senate committee rooms at last worked their way onto the Senate floor. Senator Baker, the champion of S.Res. 20, recalled the story often told about humorist Will Rogers, as he spoke on behalf of the resolution:

The story goes, that Rogers went home after a few months in Washington and was walking down the street of his hometown and someone said, ‘Will, is it true that Congress is made up of thieves and rascals?’ He said, ‘Yes, but it is a good cross section of its constituency. Mr. President, Congress is not made up of thieves and rascals but we are a good cross section of our constituency. We are indeed a microcosm of America. Sometimes our arguments are better than they are at other times. But there is no point in us cleaning up our act. We are what we are. And we are a good cross section of America and because of that, America is entitled to watch and to know what we are doing. (Baker, Congres-

sional Record, February 4, 1982, p. S 347)

Along with Senate veterans like Senators Russell Long of Louisiana and John Stennis, a Democrat from Mississippi, Senator John Danforth, a Republican of Missouri, stepped up to oppose S.Res. 20. In the first day of debate February 2, Senator Danforth said he was concerned that the presence of television cameras would change the nature of the discourse in the Senate, because, he said, “the nature of conversation before a television camera for a person who wants to be on the television camera is different from the nature of conversation and discussion when the television camera is not going.” (Danforth, Congressional Record, February 2, 1982, p. S 270) Senator Danforth, as other foes of S.Res. 20 did, focused his comments on his vision of what the Senate should represent in the American scheme of democracy:

It is my concern that we in the Senate are so overloaded in our time scheduling and so pulled apart by sundry demands that are made on us that we tend to be given to too little consideration in debate on major policy questions and too much effort either to respond to the immediate issues before us or to figure out some unique way of presenting ourselves to our constituents or to the country.

I am concerned that the televising of debate in the Senate would exacerbate that problem, and it would make us less inclined to be deliberative and thoughtful and more inclined to be unique, different, and given to brief spurts of the colorful rhetoric which would maximize our opportunity to make the evening news. (Danforth, Congressional Record, February 2, 1982, p. S 272)

Senator Baker and his allies, chief among them was Senator Mathias, the Rules Committee chairman from Maryland, sought to dispel the notion, as Senator Mathias said, that United States senators are merely “100 moths

fascinated by the candle of television.” (Mathias, Congressional Record, February 2, 1982, p. S 271) Senator Baker projected that, if anything, the presence of cameras would curtail lengthy speechmaking and pontificating, rather than act as an incentive to such behavior. “If there is any effect,” Senator Baker said, “it is more likely to be the effect of shortening those speeches and rendering the debate a little more crisp and the prose a little more legible... because I think public scrutiny will require it.” (Baker, Congressional Record, February 2, 1982, p. S 272)

Some senators who opposed the resolution pointed out the differences in the constitutional responsibilities the Founding Fathers assigned to the House and Senate, implying that the Senate need not feel compelled to follow the House into the television age. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a Democrat of New York, pointed out that “it is not a constitutional precedent that, the House of Representatives having adopted television coverage, the same ought to apply to this body.... We are here to give second thought to the judgments of the popular body at the other end of the Capitol. It is our role to be deliberative more than to be representative.” (Moynihan, Congressional Record, February 2, 1982, p. S 274]

Along with expressing fear about the implications gavel-to-gavel television coverage would have on the workings of the Senate as an institution, at least one senator, again Senator Long, feared that the politically ambitious seeking to run for president would use the Senate floor as a bully pulpit from which to stage a presidential campaign. “Do we want to spend [the taxpayers’] millions over a six-year period providing a single senator that type of multimillion dollar platform from which to advance his race for president of the United States?,” Senator Long wondered. (Long, Congressional Record, February 3, 1982, p. S 344)

Later in the debate that same day, Senator Baker, himself an unsuccessful candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 1980, sought to allay Senator Long's fears about senators using the Senate floor as a soapbox from which to run for president. "Running for president from the floor of the Senate is a remarkably unrewarding experience," Senator Baker said. "While it is also true that the Senate is the cradle of presidential candidates and presidents, I do not think that is any significant problem....Maybe televising the Senate will give everyone a chance. It might be nice. At least you would not be cut and end up on the editor's floor if it was live and gavel-to-gavel on the cable." (Baker, Congressional Record, February 3, 1982, p. S 348)

Following the three days of debate on the resolution, Senator Baker withdrew the bill from the floor, hoping to rekindle interest in it at some point in the spring. On April 20, the Senate was back to the issue when Senator Baker sought to invoke cloture, thus choking off further debate and blocking the anticipated filibuster by Senator Long and his allies. The motion to invoke cloture failed by 13 votes and fell even four votes shy of the simple majority necessary for passage. The vote was 47 to 51. The next day, Senator Baker offered an amendment co-sponsored by Senator Byrd which gave the Senate Rules Committee 60 days to draft a plan for television coverage of the Senate. The committee was asked to consider questions which S.Res. 20 had left open; including the probable cost of Senate television, control of the cameras, and the type of coverage to be provided (gavel-to-gavel or some other form). By introducing this amendment, Senator Baker said he wanted to address one of the principal concerns many senators addressed during floor debate: that excessive authority had been given away to the Rules Committee to devise the schemes of coverage without providing review of those decisions by the full Senate. (Baker, Congressional Record, April 21, 1982, p. S 3798] The amendment

passed overwhelmingly, 95 to 1.

On July 27, 1982, after two extensions of its deadline to complete the new report, the Rules Committee reported its findings and reached the same conclusion it had previously—for the Senate to allow television coverage in a similar format as the House was currently using. The committee did not recommend any rules changes; called for gavel-to-gavel coverage of Senate proceedings; called for an appropriation of \$3.5 million so the Senate could operate its six cameras and control studio; accredited news organizations would be allowed to plug into the Senate feed for news purposes only (the video could not be used for commercial or political reasons). Despite the report, Senator Baker decided not to pursue the measure further as the 97th Congress wound down in December 1982.

A few years later, in a television interview on the eve of Senate television in 1986, former Senator Baker spoke of the problems he encountered trying make Senate television a reality:

It started out as a mistrust in the Senate of an unknown element. It was perhaps more pronounced in the Senate than in the House, because the Senate is a smaller body. There is a more collegial atmosphere in the Senate. It's a smaller group, and more tight-knit. And it may be that the relative seniority of the Senate was a big bug-a-boo. For instance, [Senator] Russell Long had been there a long time, and [Senator] John Stennis... They had a grave mistrust of anything that would alter the way the Senate had functioned—as they knew it—over their combined experience.” (Baker, C-SPAN Interview)

In the 98th Congress, Senator Mathias introduced a resolution calling for Senate television. When he introduced S.Res. 66, a bill similar to Senator Baker's S.Res. 20, Senator Mathias said: “As we all know, innovation does not come quickly to the Congress, especially to this body. We need not worry that

we are rushing into this matter with undue haste. The idea has been with us in one form or another since the mid-1940s... Surely we cannot be accused of the type of haste that makes waste.” (Garay, p. 129)

On June 15, S. Res. 66 was reported out of Senator Mathias’ Committee on Rules and Administration. The bill languished, remaining untouched until the fall of 1984, when in the rush to close the 98th Congress, Senator Baker brought the bill to the Senate floor for consideration. Senator Baker, who has earlier in the year announced his impending retirement from the Senate, called the Senate television resolution “one I count among the most important of my Senate service.” (Baker, Congressional Record, September 17, 1984, p. S 11222) Senator Baker, who recognized that was his last chance to work on behalf of Senate television in his career, made several impassioned pleas over the course of the Senate’s four days of debate on the bill:

Presidents, of course, have long recognized the value of television as an instrument of education and persuasion, and their domination of the airwaves is crucial to their domination of public policy debate.... The Senate by contrast remains cloaked in mystery.... We stand in danger of surrendering our special place in American government by technological default at the very time when the American people’s interest in public affairs is at its peak. (Baker, Congressional Record, September 17, 1984, p. S 11223)

Senator Arlen Specter, a Republican of Pennsylvania, echoed the views held by many senators when he said the untelevised Senate was becoming an increasingly irrelevant body when compared to the televised House of Representatives. Senator Specter recounted the recent visit of a friend, who brought her 10-year-old son along on a trip to Washington. The child told Senator Specter he wanted to meet Speaker of the House “Tip” O’Neill, a Massachusetts Democrat. When Senator Specter asked why he wanted to meet Speaker O’Neill

rather than Senator Majority Leader Baker, the boy said, “Because I see O’Neill on television all the time.” (Specter, Congressional Record, September 17, 1984, p. S 11225)

Battling these arguments was another consistent foe of Senate television, Senator Wendell Ford, a Democrat of Kentucky and ranking Democrat on the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. Echoing arguments made by Senator Moynihan in the 1982 debates, Senator Ford said, “Unlike the House of Representatives, the Senate was conceived by the Founding Fathers as a cooling-off body, a slower, deliberative body, more insulated from the vacillating pressures of public opinion. Television in the chamber would destroy that insulation and that fundamental concept of our Founding Fathers.” (Ford, Congressional Record, September 17, 1984, p. S 11224)

Along with the now familiar arguments that television coverage would distort the Senate’s constitutionally mandated function of being the more deliberative of the two national legislatures, Senator William Proxmire, a Democrat of Wisconsin, predicted that television would not do justice to the Senate’s complexities and arcane rules:

My feeling is that televising the Senate will make it harder for senators to reach...compromises. Senators will find that the position they took in their opening statements have been engraved in film. Any compromising can easily be portrayed as a loss and the senator who does it as a loser. If this scenario comes to pass, the Senate may well grind to a halt. Senators are not by nature shrinking violets, and additional incentives to confrontation can only mean more argument—and probably worse legislation. (Proxmire, Congressional Record, September 18, 1984, p. S 11397)

As debate on S.Res. 66 came near an end, some senators complained that considering Senate television during the close of a Congress, when many other

pressing matters cried out for floor action, was inappropriate. Still others, like Senator Lawton Chiles, a Democrat of Florida, said the Senate should consider other types of coverage which were not included in the language of S.Res. 66. Senator Chiles suggested that the Senate provide coverage of itself only when it was considering “significant legislation,” adding that he questioned “whether gavel-to-gavel coverage will represent a real contribution to the edification of the public.” (Chiles, Congressional Record, September 17, 1984, p. S 11640)

On Friday, September 21, 1984, Senator Baker’s four-year crusade for Senate television came to its end. A motion to close debate on S.Res. 66 was defeated 37-44, effectively defeating any hopes for the bill’s passage in the 98th Congress. “It is clear to me that this is an idea whose time has not come,” Senator Baker said after the vote. “I regret, but I face reality when I find it. I will make no further effort to pursue this matter in this session.” (Baker, Congressional Record, September 21, 1984, p. S 11675)

Among the many postmortems for the defeat of S.Res. 66, some pointed to developments in House television in 1984 as contributing to the Senate’s unwillingness to allow cameras in its chamber at that time. By 1984, gavel-to-gavel coverage of the House, as provided by the National Cable Satellite Corporation, commonly known as C-SPAN, was available in approximately 17 million homes. Representative Newt Gingrich, Republican of Georgia, estimated that about 200,000 viewers watch House floor action at any given time. “That’s not a bad crowd,” Representative Gingrich said. “This is the beginning of the ability to have a nationwide town hall meeting.” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1984, “Televised Partisan Skirmishes Erupt in House,” p. 206)

Throughout the first months of 1984, Representative Gingrich and other members of his Conservative Opportunity Society took special orders time at the end of legislative days, a time reserved where members may talk on any

subject for as long as an hour. Gingrich's band of conservatives used these speeches as an occasion to advance their own political philosophy while at the same time attacking Democrats' stands on volatile issues like abortion and school prayer. On May 8, 1984, Representatives Gingrich and Robert Walker, a Republican of Pennsylvania, used their special order time to attack the foreign policy views of some 50 House Democrats by name, accusing them of backing failed foreign policies from the Vietnam War to Central America. (Smith, p. 143) Without any hint of what might be coming, Speaker O'Neill retaliated two days later, ordering the House cameras, which he controlled, to pan the chamber when Representative Walker was delivering a special order speech. This marked the first time the cameras had panned the chamber; the cameras normally focus solely on the recognized member speaking, not straying unless another member is recognized by the chair.

On May 15, O'Neill and Gingrich met on the House floor where, according to Congressional Quarterly, "all vestiges of congressional comity disappeared." [Congressional Almanac 1984, "Televised Partisan Skirmishes Erupt in House," p. 207] Speaker O'Neill, with his finger pointing at Gingrich said, "My personal opinion is this: you deliberately stood in that well before an empty House and challenged those people, and you challenged their Americanism, and it's the lowest thing I've seen in my thirty-two years in the House." (Smith, p. 143) Because the Speaker's words violated House rules which forbade personal insults of House members, he was reprimanded by his fellow Democrat presiding in the speaker's chair, Representative Joe Moakley of Massachusetts. Representative Robert Michel, the Republican minority leader from Illinois, later said that the incident typified a mixture of two highly volatile ingredients: partisanship and television. Of this incident, Michel said, "a match was put to the mixture." (Ornstein, p. 6) *New York Times* correspondent Hedrick

Smith observed that “by his cool, calculating style of video politics, Gingrich had gotten the better of the speaker and also won a national audience. Brash video politics had put Gingrich on the political map.” (Smith, p. 143)

While brash video politics may have put Representative Gingrich on the political map, they also may have destroyed any hope of getting the Senate on television in 1984. Following the so called “CamScam” incident between O’Neill and Gingrich in the House, one Senate leadership aide said, “The House having to hang its laundry in public is going to have a chilling effect with the [Senate’s] members.” (“Televised Partisan Skirmishes Erupt in House,” p. 207) Also, an aide to Senator Russell Long said the uproar in the House magnified to Long the danger inherent in going on television and stiffened his opposition to the idea.

At the beginning of the 99th Congress in January 1985, Senator Howard Baker’s role as the lead mover of Senate television legislation was taken up by a one-time opponent of the idea: Senate Minority Leader Robert Byrd. The Senate’s new majority leader, Senator Robert Dole of Kansas, did not stake out a strongly held view on televising Senate proceedings. “I’ve never had any strong feelings either way. I worry about what will happen,” Dole said. (Dole, Los Angeles Times news meeting) Reflecting later why Senate television did not pass during his four years as majority leader, Senator Baker said it may have been because his leadership position, rather than being a strength, was a weakness. Senator Baker said that Senate television opponents would threaten to filibuster if and when he brought up a television measure, putting Baker, as the majority leader and schedule maker, the one person in the body responsible to keep the Senate operating efficiently, in an awkward position. “I thought that becoming majority leader would help my chances of bringing TV before the Senate, but as a matter of fact, it didn’t.” (Sayenga, p. 11)

Senator Byrd introduced S.Res. 28 in January 1985, a bill similar to its two predecessors, S. Res. 20 and S.Res. 68. The bill was sent the same route the others went, to the Senate's Committee on Rules and Administration, which reported the bill out by an 8 to 1 vote on October 29, 1985. The committee's bill originally contained many rules changes, that were to be coupled with consideration of Senate television. Senator Byrd's streamlining measures included instituting electronic voting rather than continuing with the time-consuming roll call method; placing stricter limits on hours of debate and filibuster; limiting the use and frequency of quorum calls; and using a rule for germaneness similar to the one used in the House. When opposition arose among some on the committee, Senator Byrd abandoned his proposals, preferring to insure the committee passage of the television measure without delay. The committee filed its report Nov. 19 and Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, Republican of Kansas, said Senate television would be among the first matters the full Senate would consider in 1986.

When S.Res. 28 reached the Senate floor on February 3, it was largely the same bill as its predecessors in 97th and 98th Congress, save one distinction. This resolution called for a two-step process to gain final passage. The first vote would allow a six-week test period, slated to begin no later than May 1, 1986. Radio coverage could begin immediately, however, television coverage would be limited to transmittal to Senate offices. After June 1, and for a period not to go beyond July 15, Senate television coverage could be picked up by any accredited news organization. After July 15, then, the Senate would have to vote again if it wished to approve permanent television coverage, or if it wanted to extend the test period another 30 days before taking a final vote on allowing permanent coverage.

As debate on S.Res. 28 began February 3, many of Senate television's

longtime antagonists and protagonists trooped to the Senate floor making many arguments with which the reader is now most familiar. "This videotape will provide for all time the complete historical record of what occurs on the floor," Senator Mathias said. "It will preserve the voices, the facial expressions, the triumph and the pain of senators who are engaged in debate." (Mathias, Congressional Record, February 3, 1986, p. S 819) Senator Albert Gore Jr., the first member to speak on House television, won the Senate seat Senator Howard Baker retired from and became a strong proponent of Senate television. Picking up on Senator Baker's argument that the presence of television would electronically extend the Senate gallery across the nation, Senator Gore said that the 611 seats in the gallery would have to change hands a thousand times a day for a year for all American citizens to get a glimpse of their senators at work. (Gore, Congressional Record, February 3, 1986, p. S 823) Senator Gore also picked up where Senator Baker left off in his arguments concerning the effects television would have on the quality of debate. "For those opponents of Senate television who fear a wave of long and self-indulgent speeches, the House experience seems to indicate the opposite result. Speeches seem to have become more focused and more carefully drafted. Words are chosen with more deliberation and enunciated more precisely. Television, in other words, has helped to keep members on their toes." (Gore, Congressional Record, February 3, 1986, p. S 824)

Senator John Melcher, Democrat of Montana, spoke again about the "right" citizens have to watch their Senate at work. "Their opportunity to watch and hear us as the Senate's actions occur is a right, and I believe they want to exercise that right," Senator Melcher said. "The people will observe our deliberations, observe and audit our actions, and they will tell us...how they feel.... That review by the people themselves will be in a sense a report card to

the Senate that will help to formulate government.” (Melcher, Congressional Record, p. S 826, February 3, 1986)

As the Senate began its debate on S.Res. 28, a mood of acceptance of television’s inevitability seemed to permeate the chamber, with more senators focusing their remarks on possible rule changes needed when television came to the Senate, rather than debating the goodness or badness of the idea. By the end of the first day of debate February 3, 18 senators had made remarks about the resolution, with only two senators, Senator Long and J. Bennett Johnston, opposing it.

Senator Johnston was concerned, as were his comrades Senators Long and Danforth, about the effect cameras would have on members’ behavior in the chamber. He feared that the Senate would possibly abandon its traditional role as “the saucer where the political passions of the nation are cooled.” (Schacter, p. 507):

The real question, Mr. President, is to what extent and in what way would television in this chamber change the U.S. Senate and are those changes for the better? Those who say that it would not change the U.S. Senate, I believe, if there are any who make that argument, are blind both to human nature and to the political process and certainly to the realities of politics in the 1980s...

The first rule of politics is, ‘Get Re-elected;’ and I guess that is the second and third rule, too. In order to get re-elected, you have to get on television. I fear that television in the Senate would mean that instead of being legislators, we would try to be TV stars. (Johnston, Congressional Record, February 4, 1986, p. S 928 & S 936)

Arguing along the same line, Senator John Danforth wondered what the result would be if the cameras used for Senate television would have to focus on the presiding officer during lengthy quorum calls. “A lot of people are going

to want to be presiding officers,” Senator Danforth said. “What better way for a politician than to have your face on television for one solid hour and not make a decision or cast a vote....It is in the nature of politicians to alter their behavior in order to be on television and in order to maximize the possibility that their presence on television will make an impact.” (Danforth, Congressional Record, February 5, 1986, p. S 1021-22)

Despite the hardcore opposition to S.Res. 28, it was apparent that many senators who in previous debates expressed misgivings about the idea now felt the Senate should proceed to consider the resolution because there were other tangible benefits. Among this group was Senator Lloyd Bentsen, Democrat of Texas: “I do not think we should squander this opportunity on the part of the Senate to use some leverage here in getting a change of the rules.” (Bentsen, Congressional Record, February 5, 1986, p. S 1023)

As debate continued in February, increased attention focused on the rules changes Senator Bentsen mentioned, which many senators believed were necessary to accomodate the arrival of television cameras. Senator Mack Mattingly, a Republican of Georgia, insisted that rules changes accompany the introduction of cameras: “I do not think it is an unreasonable request that we face the issue of rules before spending this money on television equipment,” he said. “I want to see how large the camel is before we let his nose in the tent. Once we vote to install cameras, there will be no turning back.” (Mattingly, Congressional Record, February 6, 1986, p. S 1105)

In a speech delivered February 6 in the Senate’s period of morning business, and not as part of the general floor debate, Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia laid down three of what he called the compelling arguments for Senate television.

First, he said, was the democratic reason—that the people of the United

States have a right to know what transpires in their legislature. “We are doing the people’s business here,” Senator Byrd said. “We do not need to fear their scrutiny. The Senate is a body of able and intelligent people. When we have given the public a chance to observe us closely, they have responded favorably.” (Byrd, Congressional Record, February 6, 1986, p. S 1108)

Secondly, Senator Byrd said, the Senate should allow television coverage because the body was fast losing its power and role in American government. This is what he called the “institutional” reason for Senate television. He cited a statement by Speaker “Tip” O’Neill who was asked if he would like to see the Senate go on the air. “I’d be reluctant to see it,” O’Neill said. “We’re getting a 10 to 1 ratio of coverage in the news.” (Byrd, Congressional Record, February 6, 1986, p. S 1109) Along with comparing the relative power and exposure of the House and Senate, the senator expressed concern about “the visibility of the whole legislative branch.... We not only harm our chamber’s standing among the electorate by not televising our proceedings; we also harm the standing of the legislative branch of our government in relation to the executive branch.” (Byrd, Congressional Record, February 6, 1986, p. S 1109)

Thirdly, Senator Byrd made what he called the “educational” argument for Senate television, citing the words of Woodrow Wilson who said, “the informing function of Congress should be even preferred to its legislative function.” (Byrd, Congressional Record, February 6, p. S 1109) Senator Byrd said television could be an effective means for teaching children about government and Senate television could contribute to the public’s understanding of the institution.

Throughout the debate, an informal group of about 12 senators, which included Senators Byrd, Dole, Armstrong, Mathias, and Stevens, met to chart the bill’s progress and discuss the rules changes the Senate might consider. On

February 24, one of the groups' members. Senator William Armstrong, Republican of Colorado, said, "As senators know, a controversy is really starting to brew up over the question of the rule changes which had been attached to the underlying television proposal, rules changes which in the view of some are killer amendments." (Armstrong, Congressional Record, February 24, 1986, p. S 1509)

On February 26, the Senate began voting on some of the amendments to S. Res. 28. At the beginning of the day, Senator Dole showed some irritation that the debate was dragging on longer than he anticipated. "I think we have just about reached the point today where we ought to make some decisions. We ought to either do it or not do it," he said. (Dole, Congressional Record, February 26, 1986, p. S 1619) That day, Senator Armstrong's amendment striking the germaneness requirement passed, 60 to 37. As it turned out, that was the only amendment considered, prompting Senator Dole to remark that "we have been dragging this bone around long enough, a couple of weeks....I hope we can come to a conclusion, because we have other items starting to back up on the calendar." (Dole, Congressional Record, February 26, 1986, p. S 1669)

Despite an early morning warning from Senator Proxmire that "the Senate is about to become a vaudeville act," the Senate began its final day of consideration of the television resolution February 27. As it stood at the start of the day, S. Res. 28 allowed for television coverage and altered some Senate rules. The bill set a 30-hour limit on post-cloture consideration; reduced the 3-day rule on reports to 2 days; waived reading of a journal by a vote; eliminated the Committee of the Whole for the consideration of treaties; and required that conference reports be available on senators' desks before the reports are called up for consideration. The only major change was the rule which limited post-cloture consideration to 30 hours. The previous limit was set at 100 hours.

During the day, the Senate easily disposed of three amendments. Senator Johnston offered an amendment which would have allowed television coverage only by unanimous consent. It was defeated 30 to 61. A similar amendment by Senator Long, which would have allowed television coverage when agreed to by a majority vote of senators, was also defeated, by 28 to 60. An amendment offered by Senator Daniel Evans, Republican of Washington, which would have required senators to vote from their desks, was shelved by a vote of 49 to 43.

As the Senate seemed on the verge of its historic vote around 7:00 pm that night, Senator Boren, Democrat of Oklahoma, rose to offer two amendments which he had not discussed with the leadership or floor managers. Boren, who had not participated in any of the Senate debate until this point, intimated that if his amendments were not accepted, he would force the Senate to extend debate on a number of amendments he would then offer. Senator Ted Stevens, Republican of Alaska, had managed the bill for most of the day. He reacted angrily to the introduction of Senator Boren's amendments: "I had a feeling earlier that after 10 years of standing on the floor of the Senate, listening to what I consider to be almost every kind of objection, we finally had found a way for the Senate to accomodate modern communications." (Stevens, Congressional Record, February 27, 1986, p. S 1748) After some haggling, the Senate leadership, with Senator Byrd acting as intermediary to Boren, agreed to accept one of the two amendments, which called for a two week blackout period after the television experiement's completion July 15. Senator Boren wanted the Senate to have a cooling-off period before it made a final decision on a permanent television arrangement. The Senate accepted the motion by unanimous consent.

With the Boren amendment out of the way, the Senate voted to pass S.Res. 28, by a vote of 67 to 21. After 9 days on the Senate floor, which consisted of

roughly 25 hours of debate, six roll call votes, the consideration of nine amendments, the Senate had at last decided it was time to try televising itself.

Senate technicians set to work to make S.Res. 28 a reality. By May 1, the Senate went on the air, though the television signal traveled only a few hundred yards to the Senate office buildings near the Senate chamber in the Capitol building. While the television pictures could still not be seen by the general public, the Senate did make its radio signal available to the public immediately. On that first day in May, Senator Dole said that “our experts tell me that the technical bugs are being worked out and that our picture is a good one. I am not certain about the debates, but at least I am advised that we look good.” (Dole, Congressional Record, May 1, 1986, p. S 5127)

In the interim test period when the television signal was only transmitted to Senate office buildings, the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, and an ad hoc group of other senators interested in the television issue, met off and on to consider various questions concerning proper decorum in the Senate, now that the cameras would be rolling. As listed by Jonathan Fuerbringer, a congressional correspondent for the *New York Times*, the questions included:

Should classical music be played during the many, often long, quorum calls, or should only a graphic display, reading ‘The Senate is conducting a quorum call,’ be shown? Should hunks of Wisconsin cheese or other props, like photographs of dairy cows, be allowed on the floor during speeches? Should there be a clock at the bottom of the television screen during roll calls, and should the clerk calling the roll call be in the picture? Should senators speaking—the good, the bad, the handsome, and the not so—be shown in a tight shot, or should the camera move back a bit to give some feel for the Senate chamber, which often is all but empty? Should staff members be allowed on the couches in the back, or would they become a distracting background to a senator’s oration? (Fuerbringer, p. 1)

Sometime later, Senator Ted Stevens summed up the question senators had to address about decorum in the chamber: “If you bring in a bottle of milk, pretty soon, you can bring in a cow,” he said. “The question is, what are the reasonable limits of the use of supporting material such as charts?” (Stevens, Congressional Record, July 15, 1986, p. S 9060) Senator Stevens and some of his colleagues may have been moved by what they saw as excesses of visual aids displayed in the House in the previous seven years. These displays included Representative Bud Shuster, Republican of Pennsylvania, waving a rubber duck when talking about the “lame duck” Carter administration and Representative Silvio Conte, Republican of Massachusetts, wearing a rubber pig snout around his nose when talking about pork barrel legislation. (Ornstein, p. 6) Although some regarded these issues as trivial (“Never underestimate the insignificant,” Senator Wendell Ford said), they did occupy a part of some senators’ time as the body geared up for the television experiment.

On the Senate’s first day of live television June 2, the headlines in major newspapers told the story. “Some Laughs, Some Qualms as Senators Take to the Air,” the New York Times proclaimed while the *Wall Street Journal* headlined its story “‘You’re on the Air:’ New Call to Order in the U.S. Senate.” In the words of television critic Tom Shales, “television, which comes to everything eventually, came to the United States Senate yesterday, as the Senate began a six-week grapple with this strange, new, one-eyed monster in its midst. In Round 1, the monster won, but the grappler can be expected to hang in there.” (Shales, p. B1)

The most quoted remark from the floor, which could now be seen in 25 million households courtesy of C-SPAN, and millions of homes via PBS for this special event, belonged to Senator Dole, who said, “I think that today we catch up with the twentieth century. We have been the invisible half of Congress for

seven years.” In his typically glib manner, the majority leader also pointed out in whose hands the ultimate fate of Senate television lay: “For the next six weeks, the people will be watching us gavel to gavel and it won’t take them long to get a handle on this place. We can get down to business and tackle the issues of the day. Or we can fool around. It is up to us.” (Dole, Congressional Record, June 2, 1986, p. S 6446)

Senator Byrd seized the occasion to once more trace the Congress’ involvement with advances in communications. “Today, as the U.S. Senate comes out of the dark ages, we create another historic moment in the relationship between Congress and technological advancements in communications through radio and television,” Senator Byrd said. (Byrd, Congressional Record, June 2, 1986, p. S 6447) Hoping the Senate could summon the good thinking of the American people, an argument Byrd used during the Panama Canal Treaty debates in 1977 to allow radio coverage of Senate debates, the minority leader quoted from the French statesman Talleyrand: “There is more wisdom in public opinion than in Napoleon, Voltaire, or all the ministers of state, present and to come.” (Byrd, Congressional Record, June 2, 1986, p. S 6447)

Viewers on this first day of Senate TV were also treated to seeing arguably the Senate’s most rotund member, Senator Howell Heflin, Democrat of Alabama, recite a sonnet written especially for the occasion. Its first lines were (Heflin, Congressional Record, June 2, 1986, p. S 6456):

Turn the spotlight over here,
Focus the camera at my place,
Pages, please don’t come too near,
Otherwise you just might block my face.

Senator John Glenn, Democrat of Ohio, made a rather complete list of concerns he had about the effect cameras would have, and completed his remarks by giving his fellow senators a demonstration of how to apply pancake makeup to his balding head. As he finished work on his scalp, Senator Glenn said, "Mr. President, I would hasten to add that personally, of course, I plan to do nothing different." (Glenn, Congressional Record, June 2, 1986, p. S 6456). In all, 10 senators made remarks about Senate television on its first day of existence.

In the wake of the Senate TV debut, Ralph Griffith, who oversaw the installation of the Senate television operation, spoke on a C-SPAN call-in program about some of the changes the Senate had made in its appearance to accomodate the cameras:

We've already changed just a little—we've shortened the flagpole in there six inches just because the bottom of it was a little too high off the speaker's desk. We've also put a new curtain in behind the presiding officer. The old curtain was a dark blue, and it was so blue it was black [on TV]. It just absorbed all the light and the flesh tones weren't really natural. But I think our job is to produce a daily documentary as opposed to a soap opera or a news show. We're more concerned with trying to get people involved and show them what's going on in the Senate." ("The Inside Story," p. 2)

Despite Senator Boren's efforts February 27 to lock the Senate into a two-week blackout period before moving to consider a permanent television arrangement, that intention fizzled July 15 as the Senate amended the language of S.Res. 28 to allow only four days of blackout, from July 16 to July 20. The motion passed by unanimous consent. On the first day of the blackout July 16, Senator Dole said that "it is obvious that without TV in the Senate, which we will be without today...that it is a little dark in here...I cannot believe that we really

worked in this place all those years in the dark.” (Dole, Congressional Record, July 16, 1986, p. S 9095) Senator Proxmire viewed the change in lighting differently: “The lighting is more relaxing. I always work better in the dark, and I think a lot of other people do, too. They accuse Democrats of working better in the dark but I think that is true of Republicans also—maybe a little more so.” (Proxmire, Congressional Record, July 16, 1986, p. S 9099)

As the Senate began final debate on S.Res. 28 July 29, it was apparent that passage was a foregone conclusion. It was not the climactic event that some imagined. For a time, it seemed that S.Res. 28’s floor managers, Senators Mathias and Ford, were having a difficult time finding members to speak on the resolution. The Senate was empty most of the day, with many senators in New York attending the funeral of American statesman Averill Harriman and others preoccupied with the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings considering the nomination of William Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. (MacKenzie, p. 1) Although 12 hours of debate had been allotted to consider making Senate television permanent, little of the time was used. The major development of the day was that Senator Mathias’ Rules Committee had announced some regulations regarding senators’ behavior before the cameras. The committee limited visual displays to charts, pictures, and photographs only, with the size of the visual aids restricted to 24 inches by 30 inches. The displays could be used only on standing easels at designated points in the rear of the Senate chamber. (MacKenzie, p. 1)

With those final details disposed of, and the Senate for the last time hearing the pleas of television opponents Senators Proxmire, Danforth, Long, and Johnston, the Senate reaffirmed its judgment of February 27 and gave television cameras a permanent resting place in the balconies of the United States Senate. The vote was 67 to 21.

CHAPTER III

WHY DID S. RES. 28 PASS THE SENATE?

The question this chapter will examine is straightforward: Why did the Senate decide to televise itself in 1986?

This paper sets out a simple thesis question to examine this matter: did changes in the Senate's membership from the early 1980s until 1986 foster a new attitude in the body more amenable to allowing television coverage? Given that there were just four votes on Senate television in the decade (excluding those on amendments to the final bill), we will analyze the support and opposition to Senate television from two perspectives. The first perspective will be from April 20, 1982, when the Senate resisted invoking cloture to choke off debate on Senate Resolution 20. The move to invoke cloture at the time was sponsored by Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and other supporters of Senate television. The vote failed 47 to 51, four votes shy of a majority and 13 votes short of passage. The other perspective is from February 27, 1986, when the Senate voted 67 to 21 to allow the television experiment to begin. This was an up or down vote on Senate Resolution 28.

Prior to examining these votes, a word on the selection of these two dates. It must be noted that a comparison of these votes without regard to the political circumstances and the points at which they occurred on the political calendar would lack the sophistication demanded of us. These votes took place at different times, under different circumstances, and under different sets of political conditions. More importantly, we must realize that a senator's vote on cloture and on passage of a bill may denote markedly different sets of motivations. A senator's motivations for voting a certain way on cloture are not

as easy to devise as they are when one looks at a straight up or down vote. A vote on cloture is not a vote against a given bill per se. A senator may actually be in favor of the bill under consideration but simply want to hear more debate or he may be supporting his floor leader on a matter with which he has not immersed himself. Also, many times votes on cloture can involve matters of Senate scheduling and partisan considerations, hence leaving some senators more likely to support their party leadership. In short, strong feelings against the merits of legislation may not be assumed from a vote against cloture, although those feelings may likely exist. On the other hand, a vote like the one February 27, 1986, on the Senate television experiment, lends itself to drawing firm conclusions. To see how a senator felt about an issue one would simply have to consult the roll call sheet for an answer.

While there are some acknowledged drawbacks to this method, a comparison of these two votes will be instructive. We may not be able to know with certainty each senator's state of mind or motivation to vote a certain way. But it is hoped that the comparison will yield a general sense of why some senators changed their minds about allowing television coverage and how the entrance and exit of specific senators from the scene may or may not have furthered the cause of Senate television.

First, to the numbers (See Figures 1-1 and 1-2 on pages 46 and 47 for the final results of the 1982 and 1986 rollcall votes). An examination of these two votes yields the following results:

- Of the 76 senators who voted on both occasions in 1982 and 1986, some 30 changed their vote, 25 from voting not to invoke cloture and then four years later voting for Senate television. Five senators voted to invoke cloture and then voted in 1986 against Senate television. Forty-six senators did not change their votes, 34 voting to invoke cloture in 1982 and for Senate television and 12

Figure 1

April 20, 1982 Vote to Invoke Cloture on Senate Resolution 20, Providing For Television and Radio Coverage of Senate Floor Proceedings. Year Elected Follows Name.

YEAS—47

Republicans (37)

James Abdnor (R-S.D.)—1980	Paula Hawkins (R-Fla.)—1980	Charles Percy (R-Ill.)—1966
Mark Andrews (R-S.D.)—1980	S.I. Hayakawa (R-Calif.)—1976	Larry Pressler (R-S.D.)—1978
William Armstrong (R-Colo.)—1978	John Heinz (R-Pa.)—1976	Dan Quayle (R-Ind.)—1980
Howard Baker (R-Tenn.)—1966	Roger Jepsen (R-Iowa)—1978	William Roth (R-Del.)—1970
Nicholas Brady (R-N.J.)—1981	Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kan.)—1978	Warren Rudman (R-N.H.)—1980
John Chafee (R-R.I.)—1976	Robert Kasten (R-Wis.)—1980	Harrison Schmitt (R-N.M.)—1976
Thad Cochran (R-Miss.)—1978	Richard Lugar (R-Ind.)—1976	Arlen Specter (R-Pa.)—1980
William Cohen (R-Maine)—1978	Charles Mathias (R-Md.)—1968	Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)—1968
Jake Garn (R-Utah)—1974	James McClure (R-Idaho)—1972	Steve Symms (R-Idaho)—1980
Slade Gorton (R-Wash.)—1980	Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska)—1980	Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.)—1956
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa)—1980	Don Nickles (R-Okla.)—1980	Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.)—1976
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)—1976	Bob Packwood (R-Ore.)—1968	Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.)—1970
Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.)—1966		

Democrats (10)

Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.)—1974	John Melcher (D-Mont.)—1976	D.P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.)—1976
Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.)—1970	H. Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)—1976	Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.)—1960
D. DeConcini (D-Ariz.)—1976	George Mitchell (D-Maine)—1980	James Sasser (D-Tenn.)—1976
Howell Heflin (D-Ala.)—1978		

NAYS—51

Republicans (16)

Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.)—1978	John East (R-N.C.)—1980	Mack Mattingly (R-Ga.)—1980
Al D'Amato (R-N.Y.)—1980	Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.)—1968	Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.)—1978
Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.)—1980	Jesse Helms (R-N.C.)—1972	Robert Stafford (R-Vt.)—1972
Bob Dole (R-Kan.)—1968	G. Humphrey (R-N.H.)—1978	John Tower (R-Texas)—1961
Pete Domenici (R-N.M.)—1972	Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.)—1974	John Warner (R-Va.)—1978
Dave Durenberger (R-Minn.)—1978		

Democrats (35)

Max Baucus (D-Mont.)—1978	Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.)—1968	Carl Levin (D-Mich.)—1978
Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas)—1970	James Exon (D-Neb.)—1978	Russell Long (D-La.)—1948
Joseph Biden (D-Del.)—1972	Wendell Ford (D-Ky.)—1974	S. Matsunaga (D-Hawaii)—1976
David Boren (D-Okla.)—1978	John Glenn (D-Ohio)—1974	Sam Nunn (D-Ga.)—1972
Bill Bradley (D-N.J.)—1978	Gary Hart (D-Colo.)—1974	William Proxmire (D-Wis.)—1957
Quentin Burdick (D-N.D.)—1960	Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.)—1966	David Pryor (D-Ark.)—1978
Harry Byrd, Jr. (I-Va.)—1966	W. Huddleston (D-Ky.)—1972	Jennings Randolph (W.Va.)—1958
Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.)—1958	Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii)—1962	Don Riegle (D-Mich.)—1976
Howard Cannon (D-Nev.)—1958	Henry Jackson (D-Wash.)—1952	Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.)—1976
Alan Cranston (D-Calif.)—1968	J. Bennett Johnston (D-La.)—1972	John Stennis (D-Miss.)—1947
Alan Dixon (D-Ill.)—1980	Ed. Kennedy (D-Mass.)—1962	Ed. Zorinsky (D-Neb.)—1976
Chris Dodd (D-Conn.)—1980	Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.)—1974	

NOT VOTING—2

John Danforth (R-Mo.)

Paul Tsongas (D-Mass.)

Figure 2
February 27, 1986 Vote on Senate Resolution 28, Providing For
Experimental Television and Radio Coverage of Senate Floor
Proceedings. Year Elected Follows Name.

YEAS—67

Republicans (35)

James Abdnor (R-S.D.)—1980	Slade Gorton (R-Wash.)—1980	Larry Pressler (R-S.D.)—1978
Mark Andrews (R-N.D.)—1980	Phil Gramm (R-Texas)—1984	William Roth (R-Del.)—1970
William Armstrong (R-Colo.)—1978	Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)—1976	Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.)—1978
John Chafee (R-R.I.)—1976	Paula Hawkins (R-Fla.)—1980	Arlen Specter (R-Pa.)—1980
Thad Cochran (R-Miss.)—1978	John Heinz (R-Pa.)—1976	Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)—1968
William Cohen (R-Maine)—1978	Gordon Humphrey (R-N.H.)—1978	Steve Symms (R-Idaho)—1980
Al D'Amato (R-N.Y.)—1980	Robert Kasten (R-Wis.)—1980	Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.)—1956
Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.)—1980	Richard Lugar (R-Ind.)—1976	Paul Trible (R-Va.)—1982
Bob Dole (R-Kan.)—1968	Charles Mathias (R-Md.)—1968	John Warner (R-Va.)—1978
Pete Domenici (R-N.M.)—1972	James McClure (R-Idaho)—1972	Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.)—1970
Daniel Evans (R-Wash.)—1983	Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska)—1980	Pete Wilson (R-Calif.)—1982
Jake Garn (R-Utah)—1974	Don Nickles (R-Okla.)—1980	

Democrats (32)

Max Baucus (D-Mont.)—1978	Wendell Ford (D-Ky.)—1974	John Melcher (D-Mont.)—1976
Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas)—1970	John Glenn (D-Ohio)—1974	H. Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)—1976
Joseph Biden (D-Del.)—1972	Albert Gore Jr. (D-Tenn.)—1984	George Mitchell (D-Maine)—1980
Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.)—1982	Tom Harkin (D-Iowa)—1984	D.P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.)—1976
David Boren (D-Okla.)—1978	Gary Hart (D-Colo.)—1974	Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.)—1960
Bill Bradley (D-N.J.)—1978	Howell Heflin (D-Ala.)—1978	David Pryor (D-Ark.)—1978
Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.)—1958	Ed. Kennedy (D-Mass.)—1962	Don Riegle (D-Mich.)—1976
Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.)—1970	Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.)—1982	James Sasser (D-Tenn.)—1976
Alan Cranston (D-Calif.)—1968	Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.)—1974	Paul Simon (D-Ill.)—1984
Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.)—1976	Carl Levin (D-Mich.)—1978	Ed. Zorinsky (D-Neb.)—1976
Chris Dodd (D-Conn.)—1980	Spark Matsunaga (D-Hawaii)—1976	

NAYS—21

Republicans (14)

Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.)—1978	Chic Hecht (R-Nev.)—1982	Dan Quayle (R-Ind.)—1980
John Danforth (R-Mo.)—1976	Jesse Helms (R-N.C.)—1972	Warren Rudman (R-N.H.)—1980
John East (R-N.C.)—1980	Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.)—1974	Robert Stafford (R-Vt.)—1972
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa)—1980	Mack Mattingly (R-Ga.)—198-	Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.)—1976
Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.)—1966	Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.)—1984	

Democrats (7)

Quentin Burdick (D-N.D.)—1960	Russell Long (D-La.)—1948	William Proxmire (D-Wis.)—1957
Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.)—1966	Sam Nunn (D-Ga.)—1972	John Stennis (D-Miss.)—1947
J. Bennett Johnston (D-La.)—1972		

NOT VOTING—12

Republicans (4)

Dave Durenberger (R-Minn.)—1978	Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kan.)—1978	Bob Packwood (R-Ore.)—1968
Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.)—1968		

Democrats (8)

Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.)—1974	James Exon (D-Neb.)—1978	Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.)—1984
Alan Dixon (D-Ill.)—1980	Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii)—1962	Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.)—1976
Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.)—1968	John Kerry (D-Mass.)—1984	

senators voting no on both occasions.

- Of the 11 senators who entered the Senate after the 1982 vote, nine voted for Senate television and two voted against in 1986.

- Of the 12 who departed the Senate between 1982 and 1986, six voted for invoking cloture in 1982 and six voted against.

- Of the 12 senators who were absent from the 1986 vote, two had not been in the Senate in 1982, three had voted to invoke cloture in 1982, and seven voted against invoking cloture in 1982.

- Of the two senators not voting in the 1982 vote, one had retired from the Senate by 1986 and the other voted no in 1986.

These numbers provide a broad sketch of how the Senate's membership changed from 1982 to 1986, but a closer look at the personalities involved will yield a fuller and more telling picture. The focus of this chapter will be on those senators who came into the Senate after the 1982 television effort, offering their support of the idea of Senate television, and on those who left the Senate after 1982, whose departure helped guarantee the passage of Senate Resolution 28 in 1986.

While their number may be small, we should begin with what is arguably the most significant group who helped alter the Senate's mindset about televising itself: those 11 members who entered the Senate after the 1982 cloture vote. Of these 11, nine supported Senate Resolution 28. This group included Senators Jeff Bingaman, Democrat of New Mexico, Daniel Evans, Republican of Washington, Albert Gore Jr., Democrat of Tennessee, Phil Gramm, Republican of Texas, Tom Harkin, Democrat of Iowa, Frank Lautenberg, Democrat of New Jersey, Paul Simon, Democrat of Illinois, Paul Trible, Republican of Virginia, and Pete Wilson, Republican of California. Two of the 11 voted against Senate television. They were Senators Chic Hecht, Republican of Nevada, and Mitch

McConnell, Republican of Kentucky. (See Figure 1–3 on page 50 for a breakdown of the ages of those senators in this group who voted for Senate Resolution 28).

Of these 11 men, Senate television picked up a sum total of seven supporters. Along with those numbers, though, came a mindset from a group who had had extensive experience with television. Five of this group (Senators Gore, Gramm, Harkin, Simon, and Tribble) had experience doing legislative work in front of television cameras in the House. While they may be only five in number, these senators exemplified one of the key arguments which was continually made during a decade of debate: that the House would eclipse the Senate in terms of visibility and eventually power if the Senate did not go on television. Each of these senators were supporters of House television. They saw it through its legislative labyrinth to passage, worked at learning the new video politics, through the exposure and media savvy they gained from House television each won election to the Senate at relatively young ages, and played a role in the passage of Senate television. A brief biographical look at each of these five senators may be helpful in understanding some of the attitudinal changes the Senate underwent in the 1980s.

Senate Albert Gore Jr. replaced retiring Majority Leader Howard Baker in the Senate in the election of 1984. Gore spent four terms in the House from 1976 to 1984, where he saw firsthand the passage of House television and made the first speech televised from the House floor. While serving in the House, Gore made no secret of his higher political ambitions to run for Senate. When he entered the Senate in 1984, he made no secret of his desire to run for president. (Barone and Ujifusa 1986, p. 1248) He ran unsuccessfully for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1988. *Congressional Quarterly* has pointed out that Gore typifies a newer age politician. “Gore spent most of his pre-congressional

Figure 3

Ages of Senators When Entering the Senate—Those Who Voted For
Senate Resolution 28 in 1986 and Were Not Present for the 1982 Cloture
Vote

Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.)	39
Daniel Evans (R-Wash.)	57
Albert Gore Jr. (D-Tenn.)	36
Phil Gramm (D-Texas)	42
Tom Harkin (D-Iowa)	45
Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.)	58
Pete Wilson (R-Calif.)	49
Paul Tribble (R-Va.)	37
Paul Simon (D-Ill.)	56
<hr/>	
Average Age	46.6

career as a reporter, and he brought the skills and interests of a journalist with him to the House in 1977. Few there could match his ability to seize an issue, uncover a pattern of abuses, draw attention in the media and propose a solution.” (Duncan, p. 1392-93)

Senator Phil Gramm gained national prominence as a member of the House when he sponsored some of the Reagan administration’s budget bills in 1981. As a relatively junior member of the House, he had served just three years there, Gramm connected his name (in the form of the Gramm-Latta I and II budget bills) with the hopes of the new administration’s fiscal policies, capturing attention of many veteran political observers including Hedrick Smith who wrote that “Gramm’s media skills got him wide political notice and legislative results.” (Smith, p. 39). He showed similar political adroitness when he changed parties in 1983, resigning, and then calling for a new election. (Barone and Ujifusa 1986, p. 1280) This tactic enabled Gramm to appear honorable and honest, while at the same time catching would-be opponents off guard with little time to raise funds or organize campaigns. Some have noted Gramm’s impact on the national political scene in a relatively short political career. “The fact remains that in less than a decade Gramm combined politically powerful ideas, good timing and boundless tenacity to enact two landmark laws that have shaped budget debates for the 1980s and beyond.” (Duncan, p. 1424) Before entering politics, Gramm was an economics professor at Texas A&M.

Senator Tom Harkin has been widely credited with inventing what is now an oft-imitated way of gaining media attention when a member of Congress is in his home district or state: “the work day.” In his 1974 campaign for the House, his first election, Harkin would work a dozen or more jobs in a day, attempting to gain attention and identify himself with voters. He would work part of a day as a truck driver, part as a gas station attendant “and in other blue collar work

to persuade voters of his empathy with their concerns.” (Ehrenhalt, p. 529) Harkin served in the Navy and as a practicing attorney before winning a seat in Congress in 1974. He won his Senate seat in 1984.

Like other members of the Senate’s class of 1984, Senator Paul Simon brought with him experience in the media. Simon worked as the editor and publisher of the *Troy (Ill.) Tribune* and had experience as an owner of a weekly newspaper chain for some 19 years. Along with army service, Simon worked in the Illinois State House and Senate, served as Illinois’ lieutenant governor and served 10 years in the House of Representatives before his 1984 election to the Senate. Prior to his arrival in the Senate, Simon had already carved out a unique personality with the media and with his colleagues on Capitol Hill—“with his bow ties, deep voice, and nasal accent, he is a distinctive figure.” (Barone and Ujifusa 1986, p. 386)

Senator Paul Trible, like the other senators mentioned above, served what amounted to an apprenticeship in the House, from 1976 to 1982, before winning his seat in the Senate. Trible demonstrated political adeptness winning his House seat in 1976 and making more progress in his political career than even he could have expected, given the fact that he had little political experience and had spent little time as a resident of his district. (Barone and Ujifusa 1986, p. 1376) In his 1982 Senate campaign, Trible proved himself a more than adequate fundraiser, far outdoing his opponent, while at the same time demonstrating the drive and ambition which was evidently lacking in his opponent. (Barone and Ujifusa 1986, p. 1376)

These brief sketches point up some traits these five senators share. Youth and ease with television are evident in each of these men. Entering the Senate at relatively young ages (Gore—age 37; Gramm—age 43; Harkin—age 46; Trible—age 37; Simon—age 57), each man grew up in an entirely different

political environment than did the senators they succeeded. These men were in their teens when some of the first volatile mixtures of television and politics exploded on the national scene: Both the Kefauver and McCarthy hearings unfolded in their youth. It was a given to them that television would play an integral part of politics of their adulthood—they could see it and they experienced it. These men all came to Washington at a time when television was drastically altering the dynamics of power in the Congress. According to Hedrick Smith, “Television fuels the independence of individual politicians, and that compounds the problems of congressional leaders in rounding up majorities. The trend in television politics is for candidates to build their personal mass appeal and political organizations, bypassing their regular party apparatus. Once they arrive in Congress, candidates who get elected as political Lone Rangers are less responsive to party leaders.” (Smith, p. 36)

It should be noted further that in their formative political years, the dominant figure in American politics for this group of senators was John F. Kennedy. Hedrick Smith pointed out the significance of Kennedy’s rise to the presidency. “John F. Kennedy, a lackluster senator impatient with inside politics, was the first to market glamor politicking on TV... This is not to say that Kennedy and others have lacked substantive achievements; merely that video appeal was central to their rise to prominence.” (Smith, p. 38) David Halberstam observed that “television loved him, he and the camera were born for each other, he was its first great political superstar; as he made television bigger, it made him bigger.... His presidency made owning and watching a television set politically mandatory.” (Halberstam, p. 444)

While Senators Gore and Simon had hands-on experience working in the media, the others became active in politics and quickly learned how to use the media to achieve their desired political ends. Senator Harkin’s initial use of

“work-days” was successful and subsequently imitated by others, most notably Senator Bob Graham, a Democrat of Florida who used the tactic widely as a governor and continues to as a senator. He and the other members of this select fraternity learned how to work the media, what their needs were, how they worked, what their deadlines were, and how they could translate this knowledge into exposure for themselves and their causes. This group’s media savvy, and its impact on the 1986 vote on Senate television, becomes still clearer when compared to some of the members who left the Senate after voting against cloture in 1982.

Twelve senators who voted on cloture in 1982 were not in the Senate in 1986. Of the 12 who left, six voted for and six voted against cloture. The six voting for cloture, and with the backers of Senate television led by Senator Howard Baker, were Senator Baker himself, and Senators Nicholas Brady, Republican of New Jersey, S.I. Hayakawa, Republican of California, Roger Jepsen, Republican of Iowa, Charles Percy, Republican of Illinois, and Harrison “Jack” Schmitt, Republican of New Mexico. The six voting against cloture were Senators Harry Byrd Jr., Independent of Virginia, Howard Cannon, Democrat of Nevada, Walter Huddleston, Democrat of Kentucky, Henry Jackson, Democrat of Washington, Jennings Randolph, Democrat of West Virginia, and John Tower, Republican of Texas. While these numbers appear on the surface to show that this group’s departure from the Senate was, if anything, “a wash,” that view would not be entirely accurate. For by looking beyond the numbers, which indicates no change in the overall vote count brought on by this group’s departure, it can be argued that television’s cause in the Senate was greatly aided by the departure of these members. Most of these men had little direct experience with television and were as a group older and less accustomed to the use of television in furthering their political aims. Some brief biographical

sketches of this group will make the contrast between these older senators and their replacements more evident. (See Figure 1–4 on page 56 for a breakdown of the ages of this group of senators when they left the Senate)

Senator John Tower, 56 at the time of the cloture vote, came to the Senate after a career in the Navy and as a professor of government at Midwestern University. His first bid for elective office was in 1960 when he ran unsuccessfully for the Senate against Lyndon Johnson, who ran for Vice President and his Texas senate seat at the same time. Tower won the special election in 1961 and subsequently served three terms in the Senate, serving for a time as the chairman of the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee. Tower “does not use his charm to ingratiate himself with other senators, but he does have influence by virtue of his hard work and brainpower.” (Barone and Ujifusa 1982, p. 1051) In 1989, the Senate rejected Tower’s nomination to be the Bush administration’s defense secretary amid allegations of alcohol abuse and potential conflicts of interest as a result of his work as a consultant for defense contractors.

Senator Harry Byrd Jr., 67 at the time of the cloture vote, worked as a newspaper editor before serving in the Navy during World War II and the Virginia Senate for 17 years after that. He was appointed to the Senate in 1965 to succeed his father and was elected on his own one year later as a Democrat. He later won re-election running as an independent. Like his father, some have said Byrd had more interest in saving the government money than in having an impact on national policy. “Like his father, he is parsimonious and concerned about saving the government money. Unlike his father...he does not have much impact on major national policies. He seems more interested in matter such as his successful bill to restore posthumously Robert E. Lee’s citizenship, and he seems to make no effort to persuade other senators to vote with him. Evidently he sees his duty as showing up and casting votes.” (Barone and Ujifusa 1982,

Figure 4

Ages of Senators When Leaving the Senate—Those Present for 1982
Cloture Vote But Departed by 1986 Vote on Resolution 28

Those Who Voted Yea (6):

Howard Baker (R-Tenn.)	59
Nicholas Brady (R-N.J.)	52
S.I. Hayakawa (R-Calif.)	76
Roger Jepsen (R-Iowa)	56
Charles Percy (R-Ill.)	65
Harrison Schmitt (R-N.M.)	47

Average Age	59.2

Those Who Voted Nay (6):

Harry Byrd Jr. (I-Va.)	68
Howard Cannon (D-Nev.)	70
Walter Huddleston (D-Ky.)	58
Henry Jackson (D-Wash.)	71
Jennings Randolph (D-W.Va.)	82
John Tower (R-Texas)	59

Average Age	68.0

p. 1122)

Another Senate veteran, Howard Cannon of Nevada, was 70 at the time of the cloture vote. Like Byrd, Cannon was a World War II veteran. He worked as a practicing attorney and a prosecutor in the Las Vegas City Attorneys office before gaining election to the Senate in 1958. Senator Cannon enjoyed influence as the chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee—Cannon was said to have “an instinctive knack for getting things done and getting along with people on Capitol Hill.” (Barone and Ujifusa 1982, p. 656)

An army veteran of World War II, Senator Walter Huddleston of Kentucky was 55 at the time of the cloture vote. Prior to his first run for elective office in 1965, when he ran and won his race in the Kentucky state Senate, Huddleston worked in varying capacities, including as a sports and program director, general manager, and partner, at radio stations within his native state. In 1972, Huddleston ran for the Senate as the “hand-picked” choice of then-Governor Wendell Ford and “to a considerable extent he owes his initial election to Ford.” (Barone and Ujifusa 1982, p. 406) Senator Huddleston was defeated in 1984 by Republican challenger Mitch McConnell, who made effective use of political advertising in his campaign.

Like others profiled in this chapter, Senator Henry Jackson of Washington, 70 at the time of the cloture vote, became involved in politics following experiences as a practicing attorney and later a prosecutor. He served six terms in the U.S. House before his election to the Senate in 1952. Widely regarded by members on both sides of the aisle as a tireless worker who had thorough knowledge of the details of legislation, Jackson “turned out to be less than a brilliant presidential candidate.” (Barone and Ujifusa 1982, p. 1145) Running for the Democratic party’s nomination in 1972 and 1976, Jackson suffered from poor political timing, running in 1972 as a supporter of the Vietnam War and in

1976 as an experienced Washington insider when that approach was decidedly unpopular following Watergate. (Barone and Ujifusa 1982, p. 1145)

Jennings Randolph of West Virginia is the oldest member of this group; he was 79 at the time of the cloture vote. When he first won election to the House in 1932, Randolph had experience on the editorial staff of the *Clarksburg Daily Telegram* newspaper and experience teaching at the college level. He also worked for 11 years as a lobbyist on Capitol Hill between stints in the House and Senate, where he was elected in 1958. At age 76, Randolph surprised many of West Virginia's political observers by seeking reelection in 1978. "Randolph for the first time used professional television advertisements and public opinion polling." (Barone and Ujifusa 1982, p. 1166) Randolph won reelection in one of the closest races in Senate history over Governor Arch Moore. The margin was 4,000 votes.

Of the many distinctions that can be made between these two generations of senators, one stands paramount above any others: age. Of the six senators profiled here, three of them were veterans of World War II. While the class of Gore, Harkin, and Tribble spent their youth watching and learning about politics from television and the likes of the telegenic John F. Kennedy, none of this elder group had that same experience. They learned about politics from newspapers and radio. The commanding political figure of their time was Franklin Roosevelt, whose mastery of radio was unparalleled. Roosevelt's famous fireside chats became a reassuring presence to the American people during 12 years in the White House. "Read later in cold print, the chats seemed a bit limp and pedestrian," wrote historian James MacGregor Burns. "Read by Roosevelt over the radio they sounded warm, intimate, lovely. Watching him deliver a fireside chat, [Roosevelt's Secretary of Labor] Frances Perkins sensed that he could actually see the families listening at the other end." (Burns, p. 31) "He was the

first great American voice,” David Halberstam noted. “For most Americans of this generation, their memory of politics would be of sitting by a radio and hearing that voice, strong, confident, totally at ease. If he was going to speak, the idea of doing something else was unthinkable.” (Halberstam, p. 27) While many of this older group of senators had experience working in the media, none had experience with television. It is instructive to note that Jennings Randolph made his first use of professional advertising and public opinion polling in a campaign in 1978. Such tactics had long before that become the staple, and to some a necessity of campaigning.

This older group of senators were in the prime of their lives in the 1940s and 1950s. According to the Theodore H. White, in 1950, only 4.4 million homes in the United States had televisions. By 1960, however, when the younger group of senators were first awakening to the world of politics, there were 45 million television households in the country. And by 1980, when this younger group of senators were at work in the halls of Congress, 80 million American homes owned television sets. (White, p. 165) By 1982, White surmised that “American politics and television [were] now so completely locked together that it [was] impossible to tell the story of the one without the other. Television in modern politics has been as revolutionary as the development of printing in the time of Gutenberg.” (White, p. 165)

To this group, politics was an insider’s game where knowledge, hard work, and a substantive understanding of legislation would many times translate into influence and power. Men like Tower, Jackson, and Cannon cared little for appearances. Each carved out fiefdoms of their policy and expertise (Tower-defense; Jackson-foreign policy and the environment; Cannon-commerce). Each proved adept at the inside power games, while at the same time showing a disregard for the new game of video politics that was quickly becoming a way

of life in the Congress. As was noted earlier, this may have ultimately caught up with both Jackson, who twice ran unsuccessfully for president, and Tower, whose demeanor and lack of presence on television have been said to hurt him in his 1989 Senate confirmation hearings to become the Bush administration's defense secretary. Tower found that in-depth knowledge of defense weapons, procurement strategies, and arms control could not overcome senators' concerns about the "appearances" of his behavior.

Along with the differences in age, and the myriad implications of that, one notes another difference in the political worlds of these two groups of senators. In comparing the political biographies of these two groups of senators, one can see a difference in what might be labeled the "closed-door" politics of the 1950s and 1960s and then the more "open" or "reform-minded" politics of the 1970s and 1980s. Where Walter Huddleston was essentially "handpicked" by Kentucky's governor to run and win his state's senate seat, Tom Harkin would years later work as a truck driver to generate media attention and voter empathy with his candidacy. Where Harry F. Byrd Jr. was selected to succeed his father in the Senate and, as the *Almanac of American Politics* pointed out, "showing up and casting votes," Senator Paul Trible worked tirelessly doing mundane party tasks within the Senate to gain high exposure committee spots like the assignment he gained on the Iran-*Contra* investigating committee in 1986. In short, the older group of senators were used to a politics of backroom bargaining and intense knowledge of substance. The younger group of senators had a keener interest in the media and television and a better sense of how to use television to help them in their political endeavors. Their political world had little use for the backrooms or favors from party bosses. Their political world was one shaped in large part by the image they fostered through use of television.

This younger group of senators' fondness for television is borne out by

a detailed examination of the Senate votes in 1982 and 1986 (see Figure 1-5 through Figure 1-10 on pages 62 through 69). Regardless of one's vantage point in studying the votes, whether it be on actuarial or partisan basis, the Senate's more youthful members have been Senate television's most ardent supporters. For the purposes of this study and these charts, 1980 was selected as the benchmark for what we will consider "a media politician." Those who entered the Senate in 1980 or afterwards are for the purposes of this thesis considered "media politicians;" those who entered prior to 1980 are not. Nineteen eighty was chosen, albeit somewhat arbitrarily, because it was the first congressional election year after the arrival of House television March 19, 1979.

A closer examination of the charts reveals the "media senators" preference for televised coverage of the Senate. For example, in the 1982 cloture vote, 68 percent of those elected in 1980 voted for cloture, while just 43 percent of those senators elected prior to 1980 voted for the motion. (See Figure 1-5) In the 1986 vote on Senate television, 75 percent of the newer breed of senators voted for the resolution. While that percentage is high, it is, however, comparable to the percentage of the older generation of senators who voted for the resolution—77 percent. (See Figure 1-6) Examining senators' ages and party affiliations together yields similar conclusions about the "media politicians" being more likely to support Senate television. (See Figure 1-9 and Figure 1-10)

Looking at the partisan breakdown of the 1982 cloture vote, it is clear that that vote was more partisan than the 1986 vote (see Figure 1-7 and Figure 1-8) In the 1982 vote, 37 of the chamber's 53 voting Republicans vote to invoke cloture. On the Democratic side, 35 of the 45 voting Democrats voted against cloture. In the 1986 vote, there was considerably less partisanship in evidence, due in large part to the wide margin of passage of the bill.

This examination of two groups and generations of senators, those

FIGURE 5

Breakdown of 1982 Cloture Vote—Separating Those Who Entered the Senate in 1980 and Those Who Entered Pre-1980

Those Who Entered Senate in 1980 (13 Yeas—6 Nays)

Yeas (13)

James Abdnor (R-S.D.)
Mark Andrews (R-N.D.)
Slade Gorton (R-Wash.)
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa)
Paula Hawkins (R-Fla.)
Robert Kasten (R-Wis.)
George Mitchell (D-Maine)

Nays (6)

Al D'Amato (R-N.Y.)
Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.)
Alan Dixon (D-Ill.)

Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska)
Don Nickles (R-Okla.)
Dan Quayle (R-Ind.)
Warren Rudman (R-N.H.)
Arlen Specter (R-Pa.)
Steve Symms (R-Idaho)

Chris Dodd (D-Conn.)
John East (R-N.C.)
Mack Mattingly (R-Ga.)

Those Who Entered Senate Prior to 1980 (34 Yeas—45 Nays)

Yeas (34):

William Armstrong (R-Colo.)
Howard Baker (R-Tenn.)
Nicholas Brady (R-N.J.)
Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.)
John Chafee (R-R.I.)
Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.)
Thad Cochran (R-Miss.)
William Cohen (R-Maine)
Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.)
Jake Garn (R-Utah)
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)
Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.)
S.I. Hayakawa (R-Calif.)
Howell Heflin (D-Ala.)
John Heinz (R-Pa.)
Roger Jepsen (R-Iowa)
Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kansas)

Nays (45):

Max Baucus (D-Mont.)
Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas)
Joseph Biden (D-Del.)
David Boren (D-Okla.)
Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.)
Bill Bradley (D-N.J.)
Quentin Burdick (D-N.J.)
Harry Byrd Jr. (I-Va.)
Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.)
Howard Cannon (D-Nev.)
Alan Cranston (D-Calif.)
Bob Dole (R-Kan.)
Pete Domenici (R-N.M.)
Dave Durenberger (R-Minn.)
Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.)
James Exon (D-Neb.)
Wendell Ford (D-Ky.)
John Glenn (D-Ohio)
Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.)
Gary Hart (D-Colo.)
Jesse Helms (R-N.C.)
Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.)
Walter Huddleston (D-Ky.)

Richard Lugar (R-Ind.)
Charles Mathias (R-Md.)
James McClure (R-Idaho)
John Melcher (D-Mont.)
Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)
D.P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.)
Bob Packwood (R-Ore.)
Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.)
Charles Percy (R-Ill.)
Larry Pressler (R-S.D.)
William Roth (R-Del.)
James Sasser (D-Tenn.)
Harrison Schmitt (R-N.M.)
Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.)
Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.)
Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.)

Gordon Humphrey (R-N.H.)
Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii)
Henry Jackson (D-Wash.)
J. Bennett Johnston (D-La.)
Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.)
Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.)
Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.)
Carl Levin (D-Mich.)
Russell Long (D-La.)
Spark Matsunaga (D-Hawaii)
Sam Nunn (D-Ga.)
William Proxmire (D-Wis.)
David Pryor (D-Ark.)
Jennings Randolph (D-W.Va.)
Don Riegle (D-Mich.)
Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.)
Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.)
Robert Stafford (R-Vt.)
John Stennis (D-Miss.)
John Tower (R-Texas)
John Warner (R-Va.)
Edward Zorinsky (D-Neb.)

FIGURE 6

Breakdown of 1986 Vote on Senate TV—Separating Those Who Entered the Senate in 1980 or Later and Those Who Entered Prior to 1980

Those Who Entered Senate in 1980 or Later (22 Yeas—7 Nays):

Yeas (22):

James Abdnor (R-S.D.)	Paula Hwakins (R-Fla.)
Mark Andrews (R-N.D.)	Robert Kasten (R-Wis.)
Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.)	Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.)
Al D'Amato (R-N.Y.)	George Mitchell (D-Maine)
Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.)	Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska)
Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.)	Don Nickles (R-Okla.)
Daniel Evans (R-Wash.)	Paul Simon (D-Ill.)
Albert Gore Jr. (D-Tenn.)	Steve Symms (R-Idaho)
Slade Gorton (R-Wash.)	Paul Trible (R-Va.)
Phil Gramm (R-Texas)	Pete Wilson (R-Calif.)
Tom Harkin (D-Iowa)	

Nays (7):

John East (R-N.C.)—Nay	Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.)
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa)—Nay	Dan Quayle (R-Ind.)
Chic Hecht (R-Nev.)	Warren Rudman (R-N.H.)
Mack Mattingly (R-Ga.)	

Those Who Entered Senate Prior to 1980 (45 Yeas—14 Nays):

Yeas (45):

William Armstrong (R-Colo.)	Gordon Humphrey (R-N.H.)
Max Baucus (D-Mont.)	Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.)
Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas)	Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.)
Joseph Biden (D-Del.)	Carl Levin (D-Mich.)
David Boren (D-Okla.)	Richard Lugar (R-Ind.)
Bill Bradley (D-N.J.)	Charles Mathias (R-Md.)
Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.)	Spark Matsunaga (D-Hawaii)
John Chafee (R-R.I.)	James McClure (R-Idaho)
Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.)	John Melcher (D-Mont.)
Thad Cochran (R-Miss.)	Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)
William Cohen (R-Maine)	D.P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.)
Alan Cranston (D-Calif.)	Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.)
Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.)	Larry Pressler (R-S.D.)
Bob Dole (R-Kan.)	David Pryor (D-Ark.)
Pete Domenici (R-N.M.)	Don Riegle (D-Mich.)
Wendell Ford (D-Ky.)	William Roth (R-Del.)
Jake Garn (R-Utah)	James Sasser (D-Tenn.)
John Glenn (D-Ohio)	Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.)
Gary Hart (D-Colo.)	Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)	Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.)
Howell Heflin (D-Ala.)	John Warner (R-Va.)
John Heinz (R-Pa.)	Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.)
	Edward Zorinsky (D-Neb.)

Nays (14):

Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.)	Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.)
Quentin Burdick (D-N.D.)	Russell Long (D-La.)
John Danforth (R-Mo.)	Sam Nunn (D-Ga.)
Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.)	William Proxmire (D-Wis.)
Jesse Helms (R-N.C.)	Robert Stafford (R-Vt.)
Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.)	John Stennis (D-S.C.)
J. Bennett Johnston (D-La.)	Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.)

FIGURE 7

Breakdown of 1982 Cloture Vote—Separating Senators Based on their Party Affiliation

Republicans (37 Yeas —16 Nays)

Republicans Voting to Invoke Cloture (37):

James Abdnor (R-S.D.)
Mark Andrews (R-N.D.)
William Armstrong (R-Colo.)
Howard Baker (R-Tenn.)
Nicholas Brady (R-N.J.)
John Chafee (R-R.I.)
Thad Cochran (R-Miss.)
William Cohen (R-Maine)
Jake Garn (R-Utah)
Slade Gorton (R-Wash.)
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa)
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)
Mark Hatfield (D-Ore.)
Paula Hawkins (R-Fla.)
S.I. Hayakawa (R-Calif.)
John Heinz (R-Pa.)
Roger Jepsen (R-Iowa)
Nancy Ksesebaum (R-Kan.)
Robert Kasten (R-Wis.)
Richard Lugar (R-Ind.)
Charles Mathias (R-Md.)
James McClure (R-Idaho)
Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska)
Don Nickles (R-Okla.)
Bob Packwood (R-Ore.)
Charles Percy (R-Ill.)
Arlen Specter (R-Pa.)
Larry Pressler (R-S.D.)
Dan Quayle (R-Ind.)
William Roth (R-Del.)
Warren Rudman (R-N.H.)
Harrison Schmitt (R-N.M.)
Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)
Steve Symms (R-Idaho)
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.)
Malcolm Wallop (R-Utah)
Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.)

Republicans Voting Against Cloture (16):

Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.)
Al D'Amato (R-N.Y.)
Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.)
Bob Dole (R-Kan.)
Pete Domenici (R-N.M.)
Dave Durenberger (R-Minn.)
John East (R-N.C.)
Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.)
Jesse Helms (R-N.C.)
Gordon Humphrey (R-N.H.)
Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.)
Mack Mattingly (R-Ga.)
Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.)
Robert Stafford (R-Vt.)
John Tower (R-Texas)
John Warner (R-Va.)

Democrats (10 Yeas—35 Nays):

Democrats Voting to Invoke Cloture (10):

Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.)
Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.)
Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.)
Howell Heflin (D-Ala.)
John Melcher (D-Mont.)
Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)
George Mitchell (D-Maine)
D.P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.)
Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.)
James Sasser (D-Tenn.)

Democrats Voting Not to Invoke Cloture (35):

Max Baucus (D-Mont.)
Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas)
Joseph Biden (D-Del.)
David Boren (D-Okla.)
Bill Bradley (D-N.J.)
Quentin Burdick (D-N.D.)
Harry Byrd Jr. (I-Va.)
Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.)
Howard Cannon (D-Nev.)
Alan Cranston (D-Calif.)
Alan Dixon (D-Ill.)
Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.)
Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.)
James Exon (D-Neb.)
Wendell Ford (D-Ky.)
John Glenn (D-Ohio)
Gary Hart (D-Colo.)
Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.)
Walter Huddleston (D-Ky.)
Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii)
Henry Jackson (D-Wash.)
J. Bennett Johnston (D-La.)
Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.)
Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.)
Carl Levin (D-Mich.)
Russell Long (D-La.)
Spark Matsunaga (D-Hawaii)
Sam Nunn (D-Ga.)
William Proxmire (D-Wis.)
David Pryor (D-Ark.)
Jennings Randolph (D-W.Va.)
Don Riegle (D-Mich.)
John Stennis (D-Miss.)
Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.)
Edward Zorinsky (D-Neb.)

Figure 8

Breakdown of 1986 Vote on Senate TV, Separating Senators on the Basis of Party Affiliation

Republicans

Republicans Voting For Senate Resolution 28 (35):

James Abdnor (R-S.D.)	Slade Gorton (R-Wash.)	Larry Pressler (R-S.D.)
Mark Andrews (R-N.D.)	Phil Gramm (R-Texas)	William Roth (D-Del.)
William Armstrong (R-Colo.)	Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)	Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.)
John Chafee (R-R.I.)	Paula Hawkins (R-Fla.)	Arlen Specter (R-Pa.)
Thad Cochran (R-Miss.)	John Heinz (R-Pa.)	Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)
William Cohen (R-Maine)	Gordon Humphrey (R-N.H.)	Steve Symms (R-Idaho)
Al D'Amato (R-N.Y.)	Robert Kasten (R-Wis.)	Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.)
Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.)	Richard Lugar (R-Ind.)	Paul Trible (R-Va.)
Bob Dole (R-Kan.)	Charles Mathias (R-Md.)	John Warner (R-Va.)
Pete Domenici (R-N.M.)	James McClure (R-Idaho)	Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.)
Daniel Evans (R-Wash.)	Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska)	Pete Wilson (R-Calif.)
Jake Garn (R-Utah)	Don Nickles (R-Okla.)	

Republicans Voting Against Senate Resolution 28 (14):

Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.)	Chic Hecht (R-Nev.)	Dan Quayle (R-Ind.)
John Danforth (R-Mo.)	Jesse Helms (R-N.C.)	Warren Rudman (R-N.H.)
John East (R-N.C.)	Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.)	Robert Stafford (R-Vt.)
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa)	Mack Mattingly (R-Ga.)	Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.)
Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.)	Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.)	

Democrats

Democrats Voting for Senate Resolution 28 (32):

Max Baucus (D-Mont.)	Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.)	Sparl Matsunaga (D-Hawaii)
Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas)	Wendell Ford (D-Ky.)	John Melcher (D-Mont.)
Joseph Biden (D-Del.)	John Glenn (D-Ohio)	Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)
Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.)	Albert Gore Jr. (D-Tenn.)	George Mitchell (D-Maine)
David Boren (D-Okla.)	Tom Harkin (D-Iowa)	D.P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.)
Bill Bradley (D-N.J.)	Gary Hart (D-Colo.)	Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.)
Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.)	Howell Heflin (D-Ala.)	David Pryor (D-Ark.)
Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.)	Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.)	James Sasser (D-Tenn.)
Alan Cranston (D-Calif.)	Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.)	Paul Simon (D-Ill.)
Wendell Ford (D-Ky.)	Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.)	Edward Zorinsky (D-Neb.)
Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.)	Carl Levin (D-Mich.)	

Democrats Voting Against Senate Resolution 28 (7):

Quentin Burdick (D-N.D.)	Russell Long (D-La.)	William Proxmire (D-Wis.)
Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.)	Sam Nunn (D-Ga.)	John Stennis (D-Miss.)
J. Bennett Johnston (D-La.)		

FIGURE 9

Breakdown of 1982 Cloture Vote—Separating Senators Based on Affiliation and Start of Senate Service

Republicans (53)

Pre-1980 Republicans Voting to Invoke Cloture (24):

William Armstrong (R-Colo.)	Richard Lugar (R-Ind.)
Howard Baker (R-Tenn.)	Charles Mathias (R-Md.)
John Chafee (R-R.I.)	James McClure (R-Idaho)
Thad Cochran (R-Miss.)	Bob Packwood (R-Ore.)
William Cohen (R-Maine)	Charles Percy (R-Ill.)
Jake Garn (R-Utah)	Larry Pressler (R-S.D.)
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)	William Roth (R-Del.)
Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.)	Harrison Schmitt (R-N.M.)
S.I. Hayakawa (R-Calif.)	Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)
John Heinz (R-Pa.)	Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.)
Roger Jepsen (R-Iowa)	Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.)
Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kan.)	Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.)

Pre-1980 Republicans Voting Against Cloture (12):

Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.)	Gordon Humphrey (R-N.H.)
Bob Dole (R-Kan.)	Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.)
Pete Domenici (R-N.M.)	Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.)
Dave Durenberger (R-Minn.)	Robert Stafford (R-Vt.)
Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.)	John Tower (R-Texas)
Jesse Helms (R-N.C.)	John Warner (R-Va.)

1980 Republicans Voting to Invoke Cloture (13):

James Abdnor (R-S.D.)	Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska)
Mark Andrews (R-N.D.)	Don Nickles (R-Okla.)
Nicholas Brady (R-N.J.)	Dan Quayle (R-Ind.)
Slade Gorton (R-Wash.)	Warren Rudman (R-N.H.)
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa)	Arlen Specter (R-Pa.)
Paula Hawkins (R-Fla.)	Steve Symms (R-Idaho)
Robert Kasten (R-Wis.)	

1980 Republicans Voting Against Cloture (4):

Al D'Amato (R-N.Y.)	John East (R-N.C.)
Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.)	Mack Mattingly (R-Ga.)

FIGURE 9 (Continued)
Breakdown of 1982 Cloture Vote—Separating Senators Based on
Affiliation and Start of Senate Service

Democrats (45):

Pre-1980 Democrats Voting to Invoke Cloture (9):

Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.)	Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)
Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.)	D.P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.)
Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.)	Claiborne Pell (D-N.Y.)
Howell Heflin (D-Ala.)	James Sasser (D-Tenn.)
John Melcher (D-Mont.)	

Pre-1980 Democrats Voting Not to Invoke Cloture (33):

Max Baucus (D-Mont.)	Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii)
Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas)	Henry Jackson (D-Wash.)
Joseph Biden (D-Del.)	J. Bennett Johnston (D-La.)
David Boren (D-Okla.)	Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.)
Bill Bradley (D-N.J.)	Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.)
Quentin Burdick (D-N.D.)	Carl Levin (D-Mich.)
Harry Byrd Jr. (I-Va.)	Russell Long (D-La.)
Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.)	Sparl Matsunaga (D-Hawaii)
Howard Cannon (D-Nev.)	Sam Nunn (D-Ga.)
Alan Cranston (D-Calif.)	William Proxmire (D-Wis.)
Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.)	David Pryor (D-Ark.)
James Exon (D-Neb.)	Jennings Randolph (D-W.Va.)
Wendell Ford (D-Ky.)	Don Riegle (D-Mich.)
John Glenn (D-Ohio)	Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.)
Gary Hart (D-Colo.)	John Stennis (D-Miss.)
Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.)	Edward Zorinsky (D-Neb.)
Walter Huddleston (D-Ky.)	

1980 Democrats Voting to Invoke Cloture (1):

George Mitchell (D-Maine)

1980 Democrats Voting Not to Invoke Cloture (2):

Alan Dixon (D-Ill.)	Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.)
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Figure 10 **Breakdown of 1986 Vote on Senate TV, Separating Senators Based on Party Affiliation and Start of Senate Service**

Republicans (49)

Pre-1980 Republicans Voting For Senate Resolution 28 (20):

William Armstrong (R-Colo.)	Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)	William Roth (R-Del.)
John Chafee (R-R.I.)	John Heinz (R-Pa.)	Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.)
Thad Cochran (R-Miss.)	Gordon Humphrey (R-N.H.)	Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)
William Cohen (R-Maine)	Richard Lugar (R-Ind.)	Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.)
Bob Dole (R-Kan.)	Charles Mathias (R-Md.)	John Warner (R-Va.)
Pete Domenici (R-N.M.)	James McClure (R-Idaho)	Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.)
Jake Garn (R-Utah)	Larry Pressler (R-S.D.)	

Pre-1980 Republicans Voting Against Senate Resolution 28 (7):

Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.)	Jesse Helms (R-N.C.)	Robert Stafford (R-Vt.)
John Danforth (R-Mo.)	Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.)	Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.)
Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.)		

1980 and Post-1980 Republicans Voting For Senate Resolution 28 (15):

James Abdnor (R-S.D.)	Slade Gorton (R-Wash.)	Don Nickles (R-Okla.)
Mark Andrews (R-N.D.)	Phil Gramm (R-Texas)	Arlen Specter (R-Pa.)
Al D'Amato (R-N.Y.)	Paula Hwkins (R-Fla.)	Steve Symms (R-Idaho)
Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.)	Robert Kasten (R-Wis.)	Paul Trible (R-Va.)
Daniel Evans (R-Wash.)	Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska)	Pete Wilson (R-Calif.)

1980 and Post-1980 Republicans Voting Against Senate Resolution 28 (7):

John East (R-N.C.)	Mack Mattingly (R-Ga.)	Dan Quayle (R-Ind.)
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa)	Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.)	Warren Rudman (R-N.H.)
Chic Hecht (R-Nev.)		

Figure 10 (Continued)
**Breakdown of 1986 Vote on Senate TV, Separating Senators Based on
Party Affiliation and Start of Senate Service**

Democrats (39)

Pre-1980 Democrats Voting for Senate Resolution 28 (25):

Max Baucus (D-Mont.)	Wendell Ford (D-Ky.)	John Melcher (D-Mont.)
Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas)	John Glenn (D-Ohio)	Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)
Joseph Biden (D-Del.)	Gary Hart (D-Colo.)	D.P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.)
David Boren (D-Okla.)	Howell Heflin (D-Ala.)	Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.)
Bill Bradley (D-N.J.)	Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.)	David Pryor (D-Ark.)
Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.)	Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.)	Don Riegle (D-Mich.)
Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.)	Carl Levin (D-Mich.)	James Sasser (D-Tenn.)
Alan Cranston (D-Calif.)	Spark Matsunaga (D-Hawaii)	Edward Zorinsky (D-Neb.)
Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.)		

Pre-1980 Democrats Voting Against Senate Resolution 28 (7):

Quentin Burdick (D-N.D.)	Russell Long (D-La.)	William Proxmire (D-Wis.)
Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.)	Sam Nunn (D-Ga.)	John Stennis (D-Miss.)
J. Bennett Johnston (D-La.)		

1980 and Post-1980 Democrats Voting for Senate Resolution 28 (7):

Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.)	Tom Harkin (D-Iowa)	George Mitchell (D-Maine)
Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.)	Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.)	Paul Simon (D-Ill.)
Albert Gore Jr. (D-Tenn.)		

1980 and Post-1980 Democrats Voting Against Senate Resolution 28 (0):

None

present in the 1982 Senate and those there in 1986, has been helpful in providing a base of information on which to examine this paper's thesis question. We turn now to that task.

CHAPTER IV

AN OUTGROWTH OF SENATE TELEVISION: 'THE INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM IN THIS TOWN'

The preceding chapter highlighted some of the differences between the Senate membership in 1982 and in 1986. Did changes in membership influence the outcome of the final vote on Senate television in February 1986?

After tracing the history of the media's relationship with Congress, the legislative histories of House and Senate television, and comparing the entering and exiting senators of the 1980s, we are led by informed speculation to conclude that it did.

The Senate of 1982 was significantly different from that of 1986. The older members of the 1982 Senate, which had the first significant vote on the fate of allowing cameras in the chamber, had less of the media savvy which characterized the senators who entered the Senate in time for the 1986 vote on Senate Resolution 28. This new group was younger, accustomed to a Congress where there was more independence from the demands of party leaders, and where their media skills played a critical role in their legislative and political interests. By comparing the backgrounds of Senators Phil Gramm, Albert Gore Jr., and Tom Harkin to men like Senators Jennings Randolph, Howard Cannon, and Harry Byrd Jr., the contrast became apparent.

The research in chapter three also disclosed that this younger group of senators came to age where the dominant political medium was fast becoming television, with John F. Kennedy as television's first reigning president. Scholars and contemporaries of President Kennedy agree that he was the first national political figure to fully seize the opportunities television offered. He

was the first to offer himself for live, nationally televised press conferences. His looks, self-assured manner, and sense of humor transformed his press conferences held in the State Department auditorium into major newsmaking events.

The older men who departed the Senate before 1986 had little experience with television. They were more at ease with radio. After all, the first president most familiar to these men as they grew up was the great master of radio, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Like Kennedy, Roosevelt made himself available to the press in a manner hitherto unknown. His nationally broadcast “fireside chats” became household events during the depression. In their late teens and early twenties, this group of senators could have heard Roosevelt’s voice reassuring the nation about its economic health and destiny. So it was in radio, not television, that this group of senators began their political careers. The contrast between Kennedy and Roosevelt, and the medium each excelled at, gave a broad idea of how these different groups of senators viewed television, their comfort level with the medium.

While this thesis concludes that changes in the Senate’s membership contributed to the adoption of Senate television, it is important to note that this is but one of perhaps several factors leading to the passage of Senate Resolution 28. Along with the Senate’s change in membership, other events which took place between the initial cloture vote in 1982 and the 1986 vote should be considered.

Chief among them was the Democrats change of heart over this time span. By examining the roll call votes in 1982 and 1986, we see that the number of Democratic senators supporting television increased from 10 to 32. One of the more revealing changes in the group was Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia, the Senate minority leader. Senator Byrd’s change of heart may have indicated an attitudinal change within the Democratic party and its willingness

to make changes in order to regain majority status in the Senate. Perhaps after six years as the Senate's minority party (the Republicans took control in the 1980 election), the Democrats had at last realized that they were in fact the minority party and, if that situation was going to change, it would only change if Democratic senators took positive, concrete steps to be competitive at the polls. It would follow that adopting Senate television may have been a part of the Senate Democrats' overall strategy, thereby hoping to make themselves more visible to the voters and more successful in elections.

In winning back control of the Senate in 1986, it is interesting to note that the Democrats owed at least a portion of the credit to Senator George Mitchell, a Democrat of Maine, who headed the Senate Democratic Campaign Committee. Two years later in 1988, with Senator Byrd stepping aside as Senate majority leader, the Democrats elected Senator Mitchell as their new floor leader. His election was widely discussed in the press and within political circles as a victory for a telegenic man, who could better present the Democrats' positions on television and in the media. After a string of majority leaders like Senators Lyndon Johnson, Mike Mansfield, and Robert Byrd, Senator Mitchell's elevation to majority leader marked him in sharp contrast to this crusty group of predecessors. It could even be argued that Senator Mitchell's election to his party's senior leadership post marked the culmination of the Senate Democrats' plans to use television more actively in pursuit of political advantage.

Along with the partial explanations of why the Senate went on television which have been offered in this concluding chapter, we must go beyond that to examine the implications of Senate television. What has the introduction of television meant to the way the Senate, and indeed Washington, works?

By allowing television coverage, the Senate caught up with the House in

terms of having a national cable audience view its proceedings on a daily basis. Although C-SPAN, which telecasts all House floor action, is available in 29 million more households than C-SPAN II, which telecasts all Senate floor debate, the Senate is now at least on television, and arguably as visible as the House is. Perhaps just as importantly, both the House and Senate can now be seen on the nightly news of the networks, which regularly pull sound bites from members speaking in both chambers.

Along with the enhanced visibility, the public can now gauge the performances of their senators and the institution as a whole. Since 1986, the issue coming before the Senate which took on perhaps the most public prominence, with C-SPAN II and the Cable News Network providing unedited coverage, was the nomination of John Tower to be the Bush administration's secretary of defense in February and March 1989. The public could see the days of sometimes rancorous debate unfold, with much of the debate focusing on the alleged soap opera-like activities of the former Republican senator from Texas. A month after the debate, Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia had some observations on the nomination fight:

It was bitter. But not because there was television. As you know, I'm a neanderthal and have been there a long time before television. I've seen it bitter. I've seen senators have to take their seats under Rule 19. That hasn't been done since television has been in the Senate. It has been bitter in the days when Representative Foote drew a gun on Thomas Hart Benton of the state of Missouri....I don't think [television] excites the passions anymore than they've been excited before. (Byrd, "Ten Years of Televising Congress")

Along with restoring the Senate's visibility vis-a-vis the House of Representatives, and arguably better educating the public about the workings of its government, televising the Senate established an internal communications

network among politicians, congressional staff, lobbyists, political journalists, and grassroots organizers which was hitherto not possible. Members of these different groupings of what might be called “political elites” could now instantly communicate about the status of legislation before the Senate, the performance of a key senator, or the attitudes of members of the Senate’s leadership simply by watching them on C-SPAN II. Thomas Mann, a scholar at the Brookings Institution, has said that “C-SPAN and the televised proceedings of the House and Senate are now a central part of the internal communications system in this town. It involves members, it involves staff, lobbyists, journalists, issue activists—people communicate with one another. It’s the basis for monitoring floor debate and congressional hearings. As a consequence, I think members are better informed about floor debate and less reliant on the information brokers.” (Mann, “Ten Years of Televising Congress”)

An anecdote from a recent book about the Supreme Court nomination of Judge Robert Bork by Ethan Bronner, the legal correspondent for the *Boston Globe*, illustrates how this internal communications network can work in Washington:

After the [nomination] announcement [Federal Judge Robert] Bork accompanied [White House lobbyist] William L. Ball III, an affable southerner with a honey-coated accent, to his West Wing office. As Bork settled into an armchair, Ball flicked on the television to the C-SPAN [II] network, which broadcasts live the proceedings of the Senate. He wanted to see if there was any reaction yet to the nomination made less than an hour before.

There was.

Even before the picture blinked on, Ball and Bork could detect the inimitable Brahmin accent of the senior senator from Massachusetts, Edward M. Kennedy....

Watching the proceedings on a television was Kennedy aide Jeffrey Blattner. He admired the way the senator unwound, delivering the statement

with style and force. But he realized it was a risky speech. When it was over, he said to himself, 'Now we better win.' (Bronner, p. 98-9)

As the story indicates, the impressions drawn on both sides of the Bork nomination fight, both at the White House and in Senator Kennedy's office, were instantaneous. Neither side in this example had to rely on the media to tell them what Senator Kennedy had said or the way he had said it. Members of the Senate, and those whose lives revolve around those senators (including congressional staff, members of the executive and judicial branches, journalists, and lobbyists), now had a vehicle in Senate television to provide them with information they wanted very badly—an unfiltered and instantly reachable channel to see for themselves how senators were voting and behaving.

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